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MAY FEDERAL PROSECUTORS TAKE
DIRECTION FROM THE PRESIDENT?
Bruce A. Green* & Rebecca Roiphe**
Suppose the president sought to serve as prosecutor-in-chief telling
prosecutors when to initiate or dismiss criminal charges in individual cases
and making other discretionary decisions that are normally reserved to
trained professionals familiar with the facts, law, and traditions of the U.S.
Department of Justice. To what extent may prosecutors follow the
president's direction? In recent presidential administrations, the president
has respected prosecutorial independence; while making policy decisions,
the president deferred to the Attorney General and subordinate federal
prosecutors to conduct individual criminal cases. In a recent article, we
argued that this is as it should be because the president has no constitutional
or statutory authority to controlfederal criminal prosecutions. But suppose
one comes to the contrary conclusion-that the president, as chief executive,
has authority to decide how individual criminal prosecutions should be
conducted. In this Article, we explore the consequences for prosecutors who
receive the president's orders.
We argue here that federal prosecutors cannot invariably and
unquestioningly follow the president's direction because doing so would
violate ethical rules and professional norms. Further, because prosecutors'
professional obligations are created by courts and endorsed by federal
statute, presidential control over prosecutorial decision-making would lead
to serious separation-of-powers concerns. Particularly, the integrity of the
judicial system depends on the ethical rules at issue. By exploring these
separation-of-powers concerns, this Article contributes to a growing debate
about the power of the executive over prosecution and further supports the
independence of the DOJ and federal prosecutors.
* Louis Stein Chair, Fordham University School of Law.
** Professor of Law, New York Law School. We would like to thank Doni Gewirtzman,
Steve Landsman, Ed Purcell, and Jessica Roth for their thoughtful comments and suggestions
on earlier drafts. We presented this Article at the Fordham Colloquium entitled The Varied
Roles, Regulation, and Professional Responsibilities of Government Lawyers, the Rutgers
Faculty Workshop, and the American Association of Law Schools 2019 Annual Meeting. We
are grateful to the participants in these programs for their helpful contributions to this project.
For an overview of the Fordham Colloquium, see Bruce A. Green, Lawyers in Government
Service-a Foreword, 87 FORDHAM L. REv. 1791 (2019).
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INTRODUCTION
President Trump's lawyers have insisted that the U.S. Constitution gives
the president "exclusive authority over the ultimate conduct and disposition
of all criminal investigations and over those executive branch officials
responsible for conducting those investigations."1 The president and his
team are not alone in claiming this authority for the executive. 2 For example,
in Morrison v. Olson,3 which upheld the federal independent counsel law that
was later allowed to sunset, the late Justice Antonin Scalia argued in dissent
that the Constitution vests executive power in the president and that
"[g]overnmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially
executive function." 4 Many prominent constitutional scholars agree with
Justice Scalia that the independent counsel law violated constitutional
1. Letter from Marc E. Kasowitz, Counsel to the President, to Robert S. Mueller, Special
Counsel (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/02/us/politics/trump-
legal-documents.html [https://perma.cc/HF37-C3Y7]. The letter may have been
distinguishing between authority over criminal investigations and criminal prosecutions, but
that was not apparent from the context and it is not evident that different considerations would
apply in these contexts. Given the letter's reference to the "ultimate conduct and disposition"
of investigations, we read the letter as a claim of authority over federal criminal prosecutors
and prosecutions no less than over federal criminal investigators and investigations.
2. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of
Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REv. 1, 16 n.68, 17 nn.69 & 72 (2018) (citing authority). The Article has
been referenced and the argument summarized multiple times in the press. See, e.g., Charlie
Savage, By Demanding an Investigation, Trump Challenged a Constraint on His Power, N.Y.
TTMES (May 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/us/politics/trump-justice-
department-independence.html [https://perma.cc/H5TE-P8EX]; Adam Serwer, The Bill to
Protect Mueller May Not Survive the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/is-the-senate-bill-to-protect-mueller-
constitutional/558440/ [https://perma.cc/PDT2-L47Z]; Trumpcast: Trump's Challenge to
Prosecutorial Independence, SLATE (May 23, 2018, 11:38 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/podcasts/trumpcast/2018/05/trump is stress testing the department ofjustice.htm
1 [https://perma.cc/VNR5-JG7N] (interview with Rebecca Roiphe).
3. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
4. Id. at 705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1)).
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separation-of-powers principles, 5 and although they do not necessarily
proceed from the premise that the president has plenary constitutional
authority over individual federal criminal prosecutions, some probably do.6
Others disagree. 7 This Article contributes to the debate by illustrating how
presidential control over federal law enforcement would result in significant
separation-of-powers concerns.
Justice Scalia thought overseeing criminal cases was an essential executive
function because both investigation and prosecution call for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, which necessitates "balancing... various legal,
practical, and [nonpartisan] political considerations." 8 He described two
criminal cases that, in his view, illustrated why the Constitution allows the
president sole power to exercise prosecutorial discretion. Both implicated
foreign policy-the first involved subpoenaing a former public official of a
neighboring country, and the other involved a prosecution that would
necessitate disclosing "national security information." 9
In a recent article, we acknowledged that criminal cases implicating
foreign policy considerations offer the most compelling support for
presidential authority over federal criminal prosecutions. 10 Nonetheless,
drawing on a century of U.S. Supreme Court decisions upholding statutory
limits on presidential power in the administrative state, we argued that
Congress has the authority to decide who has ultimate prosecutorial
authority.II We explored the history of prosecutorial independence in
5. See Akhil Reed Amar, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/09-26-17%/ 2OAmar%/20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/39ZG-R9MJ] (asserting
that "[t]he lion's share of the constitutional law scholars who are most expert and most
surefooted on this particular topic now believe that Morrison was wrongly decided and/or that
the case is no longer 'good law' that can be relied upon as a sturdy guidepost to what the
current Court would and should do").
6. Scholars have argued for a "unitary executive," an executive power concentrated
completely in the hands of the president. See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER
S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008);
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992). Some
have argued specifically that the president has complete control over federal prosecution.
Saikrishna Prakash, The ChiefProsecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 571 (2005).
7. See, e.g., Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our
Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 563;
William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 476 (1989); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law
Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989); Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-
16 (1994); Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case
of Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 18-26 (2018).
8. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. Id.
10. Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 15, 28, 75.
11. Id. at 32-34. We argue, in summary, that prosecuting crime is not an enumerated
executive power; Congress has authority to decide who, within the executive branch, carries
out many executive powers that are not specifically entrusted to the president; and the Court
has already determined in Morrison (over Justice Scalia's dissent) that prosecution is one such
1819
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
America and argued that it is deeply woven into the fabric of our democracy.
Given this history, we concluded that, absent any explicit statement
otherwise, Congress has acquiesced in a system in which prosecutors can and
should enjoy significant independence from the White House. 12
In this Article, we consider some of the implications of the alternate
interpretation. Suppose Justice Scalia was correct in his dissent that the
president, as chief executive, generally may direct individual criminal
prosecutions. To what extent may federal prosecutors ethically comply?
And if prosecutors comply with presidential direction in contravention of
ethical and professional norms, would doing so undermine judicial
independence?
Neither Justice Scalia nor other proponents of plenary presidential
authority over criminal justice have fully imagined how presidential
authority over criminal prosecutions would be exercised and what would
follow. This Article argues that if a president directed federal prosecutors in
their exercise of discretion, the prosecutors would confront serious ethical
questions. As lawyers, prosecutors are subject to professional conduct
rules-both rules adopted by the federal courts before which they appear and,
pursuant to a federal statute known as the McDade Amendment, 13 rules
adopted by the state judiciary in which they practice. 14 Federal prosecutors
would risk being whipsawed between their obligations to follow presidential
direction and their obligation to comply with these rules.
If federal prosecutors choose to ignore their professional obligations in
favor of their duties to abide by presidential directive, there would be
significant separation-of-powers concerns since prosecutors' professional
obligations derive from judge-made law and legislation. If, on the other
hand, all federal prosecutors abide by their ethical obligations and resign
rather than risk ethically questionable conduct, the president would be
hobbled in his constitutional obligation to "take Care" that the laws are
faithfully executed. 15
Justice Scalia considered it anomalous for the president to lack authority
to make prosecutorial decisions that implicate foreign policy, but we argue
power that Congress may delegate to other executive officials. Id at 7-37. We further argue
that the relevant statutes should be interpreted in light of the tradition of prosecutorial
independence, which weighs against reading federal law to establish plenary presidential
authority. Id. at 37-75.
12. Id. at 74-75.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2012) ("An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State
laws and rules ... governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that
attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State.").
For a discussion of federal court regulation of prosecutors' ethics, see Bruce A. Green & Fred
C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REv. 381, 399-413
(2002).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 837-40 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
that federal prosecutors are subject to the ethics rule restricting communications with
represented parties); see also United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(holding that a federal prosecutor was subject to discipline in New Mexico, where he was
admitted to practice law).
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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that it would be equally anomalous for federal prosecutors to obey
presidential directions. Part I lays the groundwork for our analysis by
identifying two types of discretionary decisions that prosecutors ordinarily
make in criminal cases: first, decisions in their role as public officials of the
type that clients ordinarily make, and second, strategic or tactical decisions
that lawyers ordinarily make in litigation on behalf of clients. Part II
considers the federal prosecutor's professional obligations if the president
asserts authority to make the first type of discretionary decisions, which
prosecutors ordinarily make as public officials on behalf of the government.
Part III considers the prosecutor's professional obligations if the president
asserts authority, as the prosecutor's supervisor, to make decisions of the
second type, which prosecutors ordinarily make as lawyers. As both
discussions demonstrate, professional rules and norms would, at least in
some circumstances, mandate that prosecutors decline to comply with the
president's direction. We argue that, in the criminal context, both sets of
rules are necessary to ensure disinterested decision-making and a properly
functioning criminal justice system.
For the president to have exclusive authority over federal prosecutors, the
president's executive power under Article II must supersede both federal
judicial authority to enforce professional conduct rules and congressional
authority to pass a law (signed by an earlier president) requiring federal
prosecutors to comport with state rules of professional conduct. Part IV
addresses the separation-of-powers problems raised by the claim that
presidential authority over federal prosecutors displaces the ordinary
restraints imposed by professional conduct rules. The broader point is that
an independent judiciary depends on independent prosecutors to bring
appropriate cases, decline to bring inappropriate ones, and ensure a level of
truth and fairness in the judicial process. Prosecutors beholden to the
president would be impeded in carrying out this function and the judiciary
itself would be hobbled. These constitutional problems, on their face, are no
less vexing than those that troubled Justice Scalia. 16
Finally, the Article concludes by considering whether our analysis will
matter practically for the U.S. Attorney General or other prosecutors who
receive presidential directions to act contrary to U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) policy, professional norms, and their own best judgment. It
acknowledges that federal prosecutors face no realistic disciplinary risk for
acceding to presidential direction since state disciplinary authorities rarely
sanction prosecutors. Moreover, federal courts will often have no
meaningful way of enforcing relevant professional conduct rules, especially
if breaches are hard to detect. But the possibility of engaging in professional
misconduct and the associated reputational cost would be a plausible
16. David Reisman makes a related argument about the flaws in Justice Scalia's Morrison
dissent. See generally David N. Reisman, Deconstructing Justice Scalia's Separation of
Powers Jurisprudence: The Preeminent Executive, 53 ALB. L. REv. 49 (1988). He argues
that, taken to its logical conclusion, Justice Scalia's argument would necessarily result in the
impermissible diminution of the power of the judiciary and Congress. Id. at 91-94.
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rationale for defying presidential decrees and a legitimate basis for
congressional inquiry of prosecutors who choose to acquiesce.
Even if ethical norms are not enforced, the practical consequences of a
president's effort to direct federal prosecution might theoretically defeat
rather than enhance executive power. First, it hardly seems like it would
fulfill the plain meaning of the "take Care" clause of the Constitution if the
president leads a team of prosecutors who are or could be violating important
ethical norms. 17 The faithful execution of the law must be read to incorporate
these norms and traditions. Second, if federal prosecutors choose to abide by
their ethical obligations rather than face congressional or other inquiry, they
would have to resign or at least recuse themselves from the particular matter.
At the very least, this would leave the executive branch without trained
prosecutors to pursue pressing cases. Taken to its logical extreme, it could
leave the executive branch stripped of effective criminal law enforcement.
This would ironically cripple the president's ability to enforce the laws,
whether through presidential directive or through more conventional means
involving presidential appointments and oversight. In other words, the
unitary executive theory of plenary control over federal prosecution could, at
least theoretically, diminish the president's ability to enforce federal criminal
laws effectively.
I. BACKGROUND: CONCEPTUALIZING THE PRESIDENT-PROSECUTOR
RELATIONSHIP IN ETHICAL TERMS
In general, federal prosecutors in the DOJ and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices
make prosecutorial decisions on behalf of the government in criminal
cases.18  These include decisions about the conduct of grand jury
proceedings, whether to initiate criminal charges against particular
individuals and the nature of those charges, whether to offer a plea bargain
or move to dismiss charges, whether to seek an order immunizing witnesses
from the use of their testimony, what pretrial disclosures to make to the
defense beyond the legally required minimum, trial decisions regarding what
witnesses to call and evidence to offer, how to examine witnesses, what
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. For a discussion of the textual and original public meaning
of the "take Care" Clause of the Constitution, see Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream
On: The Obama Administration's Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act,
and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEx. L. REv. 781, 798-808 (2013).
18. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987) ("A
prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such as the determination of which
persons should be targets of investigation, what methods of investigation should be used, what
information will be sought as evidence, which persons should be charged with what offenses,
which persons should be utilized as witnesses, whether to enter into plea bargains and the
terms on which they will be established, and whether any individuals should be granted
immunity."). Many federal criminal investigative decisions, including whether to make a
warrantless arrest or search, are made by federal investigative agents, not prosecutors,
although prosecutors oversee grand jury investigations and ordinarily participate in
applications for search and arrest warrants. Additionally, lawyers outside the DOJ may be
specially designated to serve as federal prosecutors in the DOJ or in a U.S. Attorney's Office.
See United States v. Dulski, 395 F. Supp. 1259, 1261 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (discussing 28 U.S.C.
§ 515(a)).
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arguments to make, and so on-decisions both large and small. Among the
various lawyers with federal prosecutorial authority-the Attorney General,
U.S. Attorneys, DOJ lawyers, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys-different
decisions in any given prosecution may be made by different lawyers. In a
given case, some decisions are dictated by DOJ policy, having been adopted
by the Attorney General for the conduct of all criminal cases. 19 Within the
confines of DOJ policy, high-ranking DOJ officials must approve
particularly sensitive decisions, such as whether to seek the death penalty; 20
supervisory prosecutors generally sign off on indictments and plea
agreements; 21 and subordinate trial prosecutors (Assistant U.S. Attorneys or
Assistant Attorneys General) typically make strategic trial decisions. 22
Prosecutorial decision-making differs from decision-making in most legal
representations. In an ordinary lawyer-client relationship, and particularly
one involving an individual client, decision-making authority is divided
between the client and the lawyer. Primarily as a matter of agency law, the
client, as principal, has control over the key decisions, such as whether to
initiate or settle a civil lawsuit. 23 Conversely, if only as a matter of practical
necessity, lawyers make strategic decisions about how to carry out the
client's objectives, such as how to pose questions to witnesses and whether
to make evidentiary objections at trial.24 To a large extent, clients defer to
lawyers on questions calling for legal expertise, but sometimes controversies
about who has the authority to decide an issue arise when lawyers and clients
disagree. In recent decades, drafters of professional conduct rules have made
a largely unsatisfactory effort to identify how such disagreements should be
19. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 38 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing
the policy in the DOJ manual regarding tax indictments); Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial
Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REv. 237, 252 (2017) (discussing the role of DOJ policy in
federal prosecutors' decision-making).
20. See United States v. Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. 166, 168-69 (D. Conn. 1998) (discussing
DOJ policy regarding the prosecution of capital cases); Rory K. Little, The Federal Death
Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department ofJustice's Role, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 347, 410 (1999) (discussing DOJ decision-making in capital cases).
21. See United States v. Kouri-Perez, 47 F. Supp. 2d 164, 165-66 (D.P.R. 1999)
(interpreting the procedural rule requiring indictments to be signed by the Attorney General,
U.S. Attorneys, or their authorized assistants).
22. Much of the decision-making authority exercised by subordinate federal prosecutors
is delegated by a higher-ranking lawyer, who has ultimate authority to make any given
decision in a federal criminal matter. One might assume that because the Attorney General
has supervisory authority, the Attorney General is authorized to dictate all decisions. But U.S.
Attorneys, who have statutory authority to conduct criminal litigation in their districts, might
lay claim to decision-making authority as to cases in their districts. And trial prosecutors may
argue that there are certain decisions that, as counsel of record in individual cases, they must
be free to make. Whatever uncertainty may exist in theory is almost always resolved privately
and consensually in practice.
23. Professional conduct rules codify this understanding. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) (providing that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and ... shall consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued").
24. Professional conduct rules require that lawyers consult with their clients about these
strategic decisions where possible. See id. r. 1.2(a), 1.4.
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resolved.25 One answer is that clients determine the "ends" or objectives of
the representation while the lawyer chooses the "means" to carry them out.
Although the ends-means distinction sometimes breaks down in practice,26 it
is generally a useful distinction and reflects the conventional judicial
understanding.2 7
Unlike civil attorneys who have a concrete client, prosecutors represent
the government or the public. For prosecutors to make discretionary
decisions in criminal cases, prosecutors must serve not only the conventional
role of a lawyer for a client in litigation who makes decisions about "means,"
but also the role of the client or the client's designated agent who makes
decisions about objectives. In turn, if a president asserts control over the
prosecution's discretionary decisions, the president would serve two roles.
First, the president would usurp the prosecutor's traditional role as the
government representative making decisions about objectives. And, second,
as the prosecutor's supervisor or boss, the president would direct how the
prosecutor as lawyer makes decisions about the means by which those
objectives are carried out.
As discussed below in Parts II and III, these conceptions of the president's
role implicate two sets of professional conduct rules-first, those governing
lawyers' ability to take direction from representatives of entity clients; and
second, those governing lawyers' ability to take direction from nonlawyer
25. The current version of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct advises lawyers to look to other law to resolve certain disputes over
decision-making. See id. r. 1.2 cmt. 2 ("Because of the varied nature of the matters about
which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate
the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such
disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be
consulted by the lawyer."). In the context of criminal defense representation, courts have
resolved certain questions of decision-making authority in the course of interpreting the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct.
1500, 1505 (2018) (holding that the capital defendant's trial lawyer may not concede the
defendant's guilt over the defendant's objection); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753-54
(1983) (holding that a criminal defendant's appellate lawyer may decide what issues to raise
on appeal). Much of the scholarship on the division of decision-making in the lawyer-client
relationship is likewise addressed to criminal defense representations. See generally Rodney
J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation ofDecisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and
Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1 (1998); Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness:
Respecting a Criminal Defendant's Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763 (2000). It is
unclear whether these writings are entirely relevant outside the criminal defense context. Even
if so, they resolve only a fraction of the questions that might arise.
26. See Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 325 (1987) ("[T]he line between means and
ends is imprecise at best. At a minimum, clients have a legitimate, and at times, overriding
interest in what many characterize as the 'means' of the lawsuit.").
27. See, e.g., Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 638 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that "the
allocation of control between attorney and client typically dictates that 'the client decides the
"ends" of the lawsuit while the attorney controls the "means ..... (quoting Strauss, supra note
26, at 318)). The Restatement appears to advocate for greater client authority. It recognizes
that lawyers must often make decisions without time to consult with the client but implies that
lawyers must abide by clients' instructions that do not require acting unlawfully.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 21-23 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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employers. One set of rules forecloses a lawyer from acting on certain
decisions made by an authorized representative of an entity client.28 When
the representative is acting lawlessly or in breach of fiduciary duty, the
entity's lawyer may have to refuse the representative's direction because the
lawyer owes loyalty to the entity, not its representative. 29 A second set of
rules forecloses a lawyer from taking direction from a nonlawyer boss
regarding the means by which to achieve the entity client's objectives. 30
Both sets of rules cast doubt on whether, as a matter of professional ethics,
prosecutors may invariably implement the president's directive, and they
suggest that prosecutors must exercise some degree of professional
independence in light of the prosecutor's conventional duty to "seek
justice." 31
And this insight, in turn, raises the constitutional separation-of-powers
question of whether presidential authority supersedes court-adopted
professional conduct rules, as plenary presidential authority over criminal
prosecution seems to presuppose, or vice versa. The separation-of-powers
concern is particularly pressing because in the criminal context these ethics
rules, at their core, protect disinterested prosecutorial decision-making. The
judiciary generally relies on trial lawyers, including prosecutors, to comply
with professional expectations. 32  In particular, the judiciary relies on
prosecutors to exercise discretion in disinterested fashion against the
background of professional traditions, norms, policies, and understandings. 33
While lawyers are imperfect, and judges have regulatory means of
responding when prosecutors and other lawyers act improperly, courts rely
on prosecutors generally to comply with professional norms so that courts
can do their ownjob of promoting a fair process and fair outcome in criminal
cases. 34 Allowing a president to control prosecutors threatens to undermine
the judiciary, not just by stripping it of the ability to impose ethics rules on
lawyers, but also by impeding it in performing its core function of
determining the facts and applying the law in individual criminal cases.
We examine these previously unexplored professional and constitutional
questions in the context of criminal cases where U.S. foreign policy is
implicated. In particular, we focus on the following scenario:
A foreign government arrests a U.S. citizen for espionage. The president
directs the Attorney General to arrest and prosecute a prominent citizen of
the foreign country when he is in the United States for business, so that the
United States has a bargaining chip and publicly conveys its toughness.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Parts II-III.
32. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980) ("[T]rial courts necessarily rely
in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel."); see also Bruce
Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 51,
55-56 (2016) (describing courts' traditional reliance on prosecutorial integrity).
33. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 32, at 55-56.
34. See infra Part III.B.
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The Attorney General believes that the foreign citizen has not committed
any crime but that the DOJ can pull together circumstantial evidence of a
crime that will (barely) satisfy probable cause-the requisite amount of
evidence for an arrest and prosecution. The president directs the DOJ to
maximize leverage by seeking the foreign citizen's pretrial detention,
prolonging proceedings through deleterious motion practice and requests
for continuances, refusing any negotiated resolution, and maintaining the
prosecution through trial and likely acquittal, until the U.S. citizen is
released. 35
The process by which a president would resolve a question ofprosecutorial
discretion in a situation such as this is uncertain since no contemporary
president has asserted control over individual federal prosecutions. But we
assume for purposes of this inquiry that the president would decide in the
way that presidents ordinarily make decisions, not in the way prosecutors
ordinarily make decisions. That is, we assume the president would not
consider himself bound by DOJ policy and would not attempt to replicate a
prosecutor's decision-making process under DOJ policy and practice.
Rather, the president would set priorities as an elected government official
who is not committed to the values, policies, and practices of federal
prosecutors. The president would likely seek advice on the relevant foreign
policy considerations from officials in the U.S. Department of State or
elsewhere outside the DOJ. We assume that the president would not only
consider nonpartisan political considerations but would also consider
partisan political considerations such as how a failure to free a foreign citizen
arrested abroad will play in the polls or future elections. While prosecutors
do and should consider many factors in making discretionary decisions,
partisan concerns such as these are considered impermissible motivating
factors in prosecutorial decision-making. 36
35. This is a modified and expanded version of a scenario that was presented but not
analyzed in our earlier article. Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 8. We acknowledge that this
scenario, which implicates the criminal defendant's due process rights as well as prosecutorial
independence, differs from the converse, where the president directs a prosecutor to dismiss
criminal charges to promote foreign policy objectives. In the former but not the latter scenario,
the defendant whose prosecution is dismissed is prejudiced by the president's intervention.
On the other hand, in some situations where the president acts to end a particular prosecution,
similarly situated defendants whose prosecutions are continued may argue that they are treated
unfairly or discriminatorily, in contravention of the general principle that prosecutors should
treat similarly situated defendants in like fashion.
36. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard
3-1.7(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("The prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor's
professional judgment or obligations to be affected by the prosecutor's personal, political,
financial, professional, business, property, or other interests or relationships."); see also id.
Standard 3-4.4 (discussing the factors relevant to prosecutors' discretion in filing, declining,
and maintaining criminal charges). See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe,
Rethinking Prosecutors' Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REv. 463, 476-77 (2017) (discussing
the illegitimacy of prosecutorial decision-making based on partisan politics). Professional
standards on prosecutorial decision-making presuppose that prosecutorial authority will be
exercised by a lawyer. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION Standard 3-2.1(a) (Am. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("The prosecution function should be
performed by a lawyer who is (i) a public official, (ii) authorized to practice law in the
jurisdiction, and (iii) subject to rules of attorney professional conduct and discipline.").
1826 [Vol. 87
2019] FEDERAL PROSECUTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
A scenario where criminal charges might be brought to promote a foreign
policy objective unrelated to the potential defendant's guilt or innocence is a
legitimate and useful context in which to explore the relevant professional
and constitutional questions. On one hand, leaving aside restrictions on
prosecutors' decision-making processes, it would presumably be
constitutional to prosecute the foreign national because there is probable
cause. This is important because a president's exercise of executive authority
is bound by the law; while the president must "take Care" to ensure that the
law is faithfully exercised, the implication is that the president may not
himself violate the law. 37 On the other hand, prosecuting an individual who
is believed to be innocent, although "probable cause" exists, would almost
certainly be so far contrary to conventional prosecutorial policy and practice
that, even giving appropriate weight to the administration's legitimate
foreign policy interests and preferences, Attorneys General acting on their
own authority would ordinarily decline to initiate criminal prosecution. That
is because the understanding among federal prosecutors is that individuals
should not be prosecuted unless prosecuting authorities believe them to be
guilty and believe a trial to be winnable. 38 Since one can envision the
president exercising prosecutorial discretion differently from the Attorney
General, it matters which has ultimate legal authority to make the
discretionary decision.
II. THE PRESIDENT AS THE CLIENT'S DECISION MAKER
There is sometimes uncertainty about how to characterize or identify a
government lawyer's "client," 39 but in a federal criminal case it is plain that,
however one reads the Constitution and federal statutes, the president is not
the federal prosecutor's client.40 The prosecutor's client is the United States,
37. It has long been understood that the president is not above the law. See, e.g., United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) ("No man in this country is so high that he is above
the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of
the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey
it."). After leaving office, President Nixon famously suggested the contrary: "when the
President does it, that means that it is not illegal." Arthur H. Garrison, The Rule of Law and
the Rise of Control of Executive Power, 18 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 303, 342-44 (2014) (quoting
Nixon's interview with David Frost). But the Court had not been sympathetic to the idea that
President Nixon was above the law. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974)
(holding that executive privilege did not immunize the president from a grand jury subpoena
for tape recordings and documents).
38. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-4.3 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2015).
39. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) ("No universal definition of the client of a governmental lawyer is possible.").
40. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 804 (1987)
(stating that prosecutors are "appointed solely to pursue the public interest in vindication of
the court's authority"); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395 n.5 (1987) ("[T]he
constituency of an elected prosecutor is the public."); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("The prosecutor generally
serves the public and not any particular government agency, law enforcement officer or unit,
witness or victim. When investigating or prosecuting a criminal matter, the prosecutor does
not represent law enforcement personnel who have worked on the matter and such law
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not the president either individually or officially.4 1 At the state and local
level, different prosecutors bring criminal cases in the name of different
public entities, such as the State, the Commonwealth, and the People, but
their clients are always abstractions-a sovereignty or the public at large-
not flesh-and-blood people such as an alleged victim and not the prosecutors
themselves or their investigators. In 1935, the Supreme Court recognized in
Berger v. United States42 that essentially the same goes for federal
prosecutors:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape
or innocence suffer.43
In other words, the federal prosecutor's client is the United States and, in
making decisions on its behalf, the federal prosecutor's obligation is to see
"that justice shall be done." 44
To say that the client is a sovereignty, a public entity, or a similar
abstraction is not necessarily to say who makes decisions on the
sovereignty's behalf. It is conventionally understood, however, that
prosecutors make the decisions that clients, as well as lawyers, ordinarily
make in a civil case.4 5 At the federal level, this would not necessarily mean
enforcement personnel are not the prosecutor's clients."). In various other contexts, the
president may be a lawyer's client. For example, the current president has retained various
lawyers to represent him personally in response to Special Counsel Mueller's investigation of
Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. See Caroline Kelly & Liz Stark, Key
Events in the Talks Between the Trump and Mueller Teams, CNN (June 5, 2018,
7:09 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/05/politics/trump-mueller-timeline/index.html
[https://perma.cc/QT6F-ZPYM] (noting that at various times the team of lawyers representing
President Trump in connection with the Russia investigation has included Ty Cobb, John
Dowd, Emmet Flood, Rudolph Giuliani, Marc Kasowitz, Jane and Marty Raskin, and Jay
Sekulow). In other contexts, a lawyer, including the Attorney General or another DOJ lawyer,
may represent the president or other government official in his or her official capacity. See,
e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2402-03 (2018).
41. For a discussion of the difference between public officials' involvement in litigation
in their personal versus official capacity and the significance of this difference, see Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 918-20 (2004) (Scalia, J., memorandum respecting recusal).
42. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
43. Id. at 88.
44. Id. Courts frequently refer to prosecutors' duty to seek justice. See, e.g., Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 65-66 (2011); Bertolotti v. Florida, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985).
Scholars have written about the implications of this obligation. See generally Bruce A. Green,
Why Should Prosecutors "'Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999); K. Babe
Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal
Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285 (2014); Robert H. Jackson, The Federal
Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as
Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconvertedfrom the Post- Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH.
L. REv. 37 (2009).
45. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2015) ("The public's interests and views.., should be determined by the chief
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that foreign policy considerations, or presidential preferences about foreign
policy, drop out of discretionary decision-making, as Justice Scalia's dissent
in Morrison implied.46 It would simply mean that, after taking account of
the president's preferences, the Attorney General or another federal
prosecutor would make the discretionary decision, such as whether to
prosecute an individual.47 In the scenario described above, the result would
likely be a decision not to prosecute the foreign national because the
prosecutorial norm against prosecuting possibly innocent individuals is so
compelling. 48  But in other situations, after taking into consideration
professional norms as well as executive policy concerns, prosecutors might
defer to the president's priorities or reach the same conclusion as the
president. As in other legal representations, any initial disagreements would
probably be resolved privately and consensually in most cases.
Saying that the president has "exclusive authority" in criminal
prosecutions presupposes that federal criminal prosecution is different from
state criminal prosecution, in that the federal government's chief executive,
not a prosecutor, is the official with ultimate power to exercise prosecutorial
discretion. One might analogize the federal government, a public entity, to a
private entity, such as a corporation, which operates through officers and
prosecutor and designated assistants in the jurisdiction."); Green, supra note 44, at 633
(explaining that federal prosecutors make decisions "ordinarily entrusted to a client"). At the
state and local level, for example, although state governors or other executive branch officials
may have authority to remove prosecutors who appear to be acting unlawfully or who appear
to have a conflict of interest, the chief executive officers ordinarily do not have constitutional
or statutory authority to make prosecutorial decisions in individual cases-that is, to direct the
exercise ofprosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 759 (Fla. 2017)
(holding that the governor did not exceed his constitutional and statutory authority by
reassigning the prosecution of a capital case, and observing: "[I]mportant to our holding is
that the Governor did not attempt to decide which cases are deserving of the death penalty.
The Governor's orders do not direct [State Attorney] King to seek the death penalty in any of
the reassigned cases, and King has sworn that the Governor has not attempted to interfere with
his determination as to whether to pursue the death penalty in any case."); Johnson v. Pataki,
691 N.E.2d 1002, 1007-08 (N.Y. 2017) (upholding Governor Pataki's replacement of the
district attorney in a criminal case but noting that he did not direct the exercise of discretion
in the case). But see State ex rel Stubbs v. Dawson, 119 P. 360, 364-65 (Kan. 1911)
(upholding the governor's power to direct the state attorney general to initiate a prosecution);
Garrett v. State ex rel Atty. Gen., 238 P. 846, 847 (Okla. 1925) (describing a statute
authorizing the governor to initiate prosecutions). The allocation of decision-making authority
when a state is a party in civil, rather than criminal, litigation is more ambiguous. It has been
suggested, however, that state attorneys general ordinarily have more independence from
governors than the U.S. Attorney General has been assumed to have from the president. See
generally William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys
General, and Lessonsfrom the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2478-79 (2006).
46. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726-29 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., A Tale of Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Ramsey Clark
and the Selective Non-Prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, 62 S.C. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (2010)
(describing a discussion within President Lyndon Johnson's cabinet regarding whether to
prosecute black leaders for inciting urban riots, after which Attorney General Ramsay Clark
made the decision not to prosecute, contrary to the preference of other cabinet members).
48. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-4.3 (AM.
BAR Ass'N 2015).
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employees and is headed by a board of directors. 49 Although the client is the
entity, which is a legal abstraction, the decisions that are conventionally made
by a client must be made by one or more individuals as the entity's
representatives-that is, in the language of the professional conduct rules, by
the entity's "duly authorized constituents." 50 In the corporate context, the
corporate bylaws determine who stands in the client's shoes. 51 Typically,
the ultimate decision maker is the board.52 The corporate board may opt to
delegate its authority to the corporation's chief executive officer, to another
corporate officer, or to the corporation's in-house or outside counsel. 53 But
even if it does so, as the ultimate decision maker, the board can reassume that
power in a particular case. In a federal criminal case, one might argue, the
president, with Congress's consent, ordinarily delegates authority to DOJ
lawyers, just as the board ordinarily delegates to subordinate officers or
lawyers. 54 But when it matters, the president can reassert authority just as
the corporate board may. In other words, on this account, the president is the
federal government's ultimate "duly authorized constituent" for purposes of
decision-making.
If one accepts this account of how authority is constitutionally allocated in
federal criminal cases, professional conduct rules dictate restraints on
prosecutors as lawyers for the United States. In general, lawyers for an
entity, including a public entity, owe duties of competence and loyalty to the
entity, not to the officers or other representatives who direct the
representation on the entity's behalf.55 That means that the entity's lawyers
cannot simply accept imprudent direction from the entity's authorized
representatives as lawyers might from a flesh-and-blood client. 56 Entity
lawyers have a responsibility, at minimum, to intercede when the entity's
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (recognizing that, subject to exceptions, the principles governing the representation of
a private entity apply to a government lawyer).
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
51. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2019).
52. See, e.g., DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 4 (2013).
53. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.
54. Cf United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1996) ("The Attorney General and
United States Attorneys retain 'broad discretion' to enforce the Nation's criminal laws. They
have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to help
him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' (first quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); then quoting U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3)).
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) ("A lawyer representing only an organization does not owe duties of care,
diligence, or confidentiality to constituents of the organization." (citations omitted)); id. § 97
cmt. f ("Courts have stressed that a lawyer representing a governmental client must seek to
advance the public interest in the representation and not merely the partisan or personal
interests of the government entity or officer involved.").
56. As in representing any client, a lawyer for an entity has a counseling function. The
lawyer must provide the entity's authorized representative adequate advice to enable the
representative to make informed decisions. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2016).
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representative is acting unlawfully or in breach of fiduciary duty while
making legal decisions on behalf of the entity. 57
How does this translate to the federal criminal context? Certain decisions
in a criminal prosecution involve objectives or ends, not means-for
example, the decisions whether to prosecute, plea bargain, or dismiss a
prosecution. If the president acts on behalf of the United States in making
decisions such as these, the Attorney General or subordinate prosecutor
cannot unquestioningly follow the president's direction.
If the president directs the prosecutor to take an illegal action, it would
clearly be unethical (and perhaps illegal) for a prosecutor to comply. For
example, prosecuting in the absence of probable cause would violate
constitutional due process. 5 8 If a prosecutor knows that probable cause does
not exist, based on her own examination of the evidence, she could not
ethically comply with a presidential direction to prosecute. 59
Similarly, it may violate due process or the equal protection clause to
prosecute someone in retaliation for their exercise of a constitutional right60
or based on a racial or religious motivation. 6 1 Where constitutionally
impermissible considerations appear to be at play, a prosecutor would have
some obligation to investigate the president's deliberative process to satisfy
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
2000) ("A lawyer representing an organization is required to act with reasonable competence
and diligence in the representation and to use care in representing the organizational client.
The lawyer thus must not knowingly or negligently assist any constituent to breach a legal
duty to the organization. However, a lawyer's duty of care to the organization is not limited
to avoidance of assisting acts that threaten injury to a client. A lawyer is also required to act
diligently and to exercise care by taking steps to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to a
client." (citations omitted)). Thus, if the representative acts unlawfully on the entity's behalf
in a manner that might inure to the entity's likely detriment, a lawyer may not simply follow
the representative's direction. Likewise, a lawyer may not simply accept direction from an
entity representative who is breaching his fiduciary duty by, for example, advancing his own
self-interest at the expense of the entity. In such situations, the lawyer's loyalty is owed to the
entity-client, not to its individual representative, and the lawyer must act in the entity's best
interest. This may mean referring the matter to higher authority, refusing to act as directed,
or, if necessary to protect the entity from substantial injury, making a public disclosure. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3(b)-(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
58. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In our system, so long
as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined
by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
59. Indeed, the professional conduct rules explicitly so provide. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall...
refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause.").
60. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974) (stating that a prosecutor may
not bring a more serious charge in retaliation for a defendant's successful exercise of his right
to appeal).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) ("[T]he decision
whether to prosecute may not be based on 'an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification."' (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))); cf
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8, 319 (1987) (recognizing that purposeful racial
discrimination in the implementation of the death sentence violates equal protection but cannot
be proven based on statistical evidence).
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herself that the government is lawfully pursuing charges. For example, a
prosecutor could not comply with a presidential dictate to pursue criminal
charges if the prosecutor concluded that the president's decision was in
retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right or was animated by racial
or religious bias.
What if the president acts, not contrary to constitutional law, but contrary
to well-established prosecutorial norms in ordering an undeserved
prosecution or halting a legitimate one? In that event, he has at least arguably
failed to fulfill his constitutional obligation to "take Care" that the laws are
faithfully executed. 62 Even if the prosecutor were generally required to
accept the president's decisions on behalf of the government, it would be
problematic to follow the direction of a president who has neglected his
constitutional mandate in this manner. Traditionally, the president's role in
executing criminal law has been limited to setting criminal justice policy and
hiring and firing the Attorney General and other high-ranking prosecutors,
and so there is no settled understanding of what it means for the president to
faithfully execute the criminal law in making decisions in individual criminal
cases. It seems unlikely that presidential decisions that are not flatly illegal
automatically qualify as faithful executions of the criminal law. If the
president is not required to adhere to conventional prosecutorial
understandings, then presidential decision-making must be measured against
some other set of understandings. As a lawyer for the United States, a federal
prosecutor cannot implement presidential decisions unquestioningly; rather,
professional norms would require the prosecutor to consider whether the
president is executing the law faithfully and, thus, consistently with the
president's fiduciary duty to the United States.
A further question is whether the president is making prosecutorial
decisions in a disinterested manner or is breaching his fiduciary duty by
seeking to further his own interest or the interests of others. This analysis
requires an understanding of what it means for any elected public officials,
but particularly the president, to serve as a fiduciary, both in general and in
criminal cases particularly. There is a firmly rooted professional expectation,
if not constitutional requirement, that prosecutors engage in disinterested
decision-making. 63 There are also judicial and professional understandings
of what it means for prosecutors, as public officials, to properly use or abuse
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 17, at 798-808.
63. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 810 (1987) ("It
is a fundamental premise of our society that the state wield its formidable criminal
enforcement powers in a rigorously disinterested fashion, for liberty itself may be at stake in
such matters. We have always been sensitive to the possibility that important actors in the
criminal justice system may be influenced by factors that threaten to compromise the
performance of their duty."); Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It
is a bit easier to say what a disinterested prosecutor is not than what he is. He is not
disinterested if he has, or is under the influence of others who have, an axe to grind against
the defendant, as distinguished from the appropriate interest that members of society have in
bringing a defendant to justice with respect to the crime with which he is charged."). See
generally Green & Roiphe, supra note 36.
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their authority in a criminal case.64 This tradition is based on the assumption
that it is in the public interest-the interest of the client-to pursue
prosecutions in a disinterested way. In the absence of a tradition of
presidential control over criminal prosecutions, there is no comparable
understanding of how presidents should and should not make prosecutorial
decisions. But if it is in the public interest for prosecutions to be conducted
in a disinterested way, then presumably this interest persists regardless of
who is responsible for making decisions.
Notwithstanding some uncertainty, we assume that presidents, like public
prosecutors, have an obligation to the sovereignty to "seek justice," as that
concept has been elaborated by federal courts over the years. Although the
concept has been incorporated into lawyers' professional ethics codes, 65
there is no reason to assume that the obligation to seek justice identified in
Berger would be any less applicable to other public officials who took the
prosecutorial reins. Indeed, the early nineteenth-century judicial
understanding was that even when private lawyers were retained by private
clients to initiate criminal prosecutions, as occurred with some frequency at
the time, the lawyers were obligated to conform to public prosecutors'
professional expectations. 66 The reasoning offered in Berger would apply
equally to any other public official: the sovereignty's interest in a criminal
case is in governing impartially and achieving justice, and therefore its
representative, whether or not a lawyer, must pursue those objectives when
exercising decision-making authority on the sovereignty's behalf, as a matter
of fiduciary duty if not professional obligation.
This does not mean that a president would be expected to exercise
discretion in precisely the same way as the particular prosecutor who is asked
to implement the president's direction. After all, different prosecutors can
come out differently on questions of discretion, and often do. But while there
is ample room for different judgments about how best to achieve justice, the
pursuit of justice excludes certain criteria for decision-making, such as the
decision maker's personal interest, the interest of a third party, or partisan
64. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2015); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, 3d
ed. 2009); R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS (2005).
65. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
66. See Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189-90 (1845), discussed in Fred C. Zacharias &
Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2005); cf
Young, 481 U.S. at 804 ("Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt action
represent the United States, not the party that is the beneficiary of the court order allegedly
violated.... The prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue the public interest in vindication of
the court's authority. A private attorney appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt therefore
certainly should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who undertakes such a
prosecution."). This is not to say that there was a consensus among prosecutors and the public
around prosecutors' duty to seek justice. Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of
"Public" Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1309, 1316-17 (2002)
(arguing that in the nineteenth century, prosecutors and members of the public did not widely
share today's understandings regarding prosecutors' duties).
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political advantage. 67  Additionally, certain principles, although not
necessarily codified in the law, are conventionally understood to apply to
decision-making in criminal cases, such as, most obviously, that prosecutors
should endeavor to avoid punishing innocent people.68 A prosecutor cannot
simply ignore evidence that the president is breaching his fiduciary duty in
giving a particular direction.
All of this suggests that, given the rules and norms of lawyers' professional
conduct, there are limits on prosecutors' ability to accept the president's
direction, assuming the president has constitutional authority to make
decisions about the government's objectives in a criminal case. In the
hypothetical foreign policy scenario, for example, a prosecutor might
conclude that the president was breaching his fiduciary duty to seek justice
in ordering the prosecution of a probably innocent foreign national to gain
leverage in a foreign policy dispute. To be sure, nonpartisan political
considerations, including foreign policy considerations, may deserve
considerable weight in other criminal contexts. For example, it would be
legitimate and not uncommon to release a foreign national prosecuted for
espionage as part of a "spy swap." 69 But most would regard it as an abuse of
government power to prosecute someone who is likely innocent, and even
more problematic to prosecute a probably innocent person for instrumental
reasons unrelated to the individual's culpability and the ends of criminal
justice. If one accepts that the professional norms of the prosecutor are not
merely a nicety but rather a necessity for the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system, it follows that the president would fail to fulfill his
constitutional obligation to "take Care" that the law is faithfully executed if
he usurps the decision-making authority normally left to professional
prosecutors by directing them to prosecute the foreign national despite their
informed belief that he was innocent. Further, if it appeared that the
67. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.7(f)
(AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("The prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor's professional
judgment or obligations to be affected by the prosecutor's personal, political, financial,
professional, business, property, or other interests or relationships."). See generally Green &
Roiphe, supra note 36.
68. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard
3-4.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("A prosecutor's office should not file or maintain charges if
it believes the defendant is innocent, no matter what the state of the evidence."). Difficult
questions, which are beyond the scope of this Article, may be posed about the extent of
prosecutors' "gatekeeping" responsibility to prevent the conviction of innocent people.
Prosecutors disagree among themselves about whether it is proper to seek to secure a
conviction of someone where the prosecutor's office has a "reasonable doubt" about his guilt
and, if so, at what point uncertainty about someone's guilt should preclude a prosecution.
Likewise, prosecutors disagree about whether it is proper to bring a case to trial when the
office believes it may not win and how likely an acquittal must be to require the office to forgo
or terminate a prosecution. See generally Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence ofInnocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 497-501
(2009) (surveying disparate approaches that prosecutors may take toward their responsibility
to avoid charging innocent defendants).
69. The "spy swap" of Rudolf Abel and Francis Powers depicted in the movie Bridge of
Spies is a well-known example. See generally BRIDGE OF SPIES (Dreamworks 2015).
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president's underlying motivation was to promote personal self-interest or
partisan political interests, the decision would be all the more dubious.
Of course, if one starts with the premise that the president is the decision
maker for the federal government, which is the prosecutor's client, it may be
the rare case where a prosecutor rejects the president's direction on ethical
grounds, and rarer still where a prosecutor rejects a presidential direction that
is predicated on foreign policy. As chief executive, the president has an
overarching duty to make foreign policy decisions in order to keep the
country safe, and prosecutors cannot claim to have superior expertise or
authority in that realm. Surely, federal prosecutors cannot substitute their
own foreign policy preferences for those of the president. But even so, it
does not follow that a federal prosecutor may defer to all presidential
decisions that are purportedly in furtherance of foreign policy objectives.
Just as a federal prosecutor must disobey a direction to act lawlessly, at times
the prosecutor must disobey directions that reflect a clear abuse of fiduciary
duty by the president. A claimed foreign policy objective may be
pretextual-a cover for a decision patently based on illegitimate
considerations. And even when the claimed foreign policy objective is
genuine, it is not invariably legitimate for the federal government to use its
criminal justice authority to advance a foreign policy objective. The
government may have to further that objective by other means, not by
contravening criminal justice norms and traditions.
How the professional conduct rules play out, in the situation where a
federal prosecutor concludes that the president is breaching his fiduciary
duty, is far from settled given the novelty of a presidential intrusion into
criminal prosecutions. If a court regarded a prosecution as sufficiently
abusive, it might conclude that the prosecutor was subject to discipline for
"conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" 70 or, in the more
extreme case, for having assisted a client in unlawful conduct. But even if
not, carrying out the president's direction would seem to be at odds with the
ordinary requirement, analogous to the corporate lawyer's duty in the
corporate representation context, to resist direction given by unfaithful
fiduciaries. 71 The prosecutor could advise the president against the chosen
action. Sometimes, when an entity's representative engages in improper
decision-making, the entity's lawyer is expected to go "up the ladder," 72 but
in this setting there may be no higher for a prosecutor to go in search of
70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) (proscribing
"conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice").
71. See generally William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO J. LEGAL
ETHics 489 (2016) (discussing the fallacy of identifying the organization's managers as the
clients of the organization's lawyer).
72. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) (providing
that, in certain circumstances in which an entity's constituent acts unlawfully, the entity's
lawyer "shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted
by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as
determined by applicable law").
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direction.73 If the prosecutor cannot dissuade the president, the imperative
under professional conduct rules may simply be for the prosecutor to refuse
to carry out the president's instructions.
III. THE PRESIDENT AS THE PROSECUTOR'S BOSS
President Trump's assertion of exclusive authority over prosecutors
suggests a second way to conceptualize claimed presidential authority over
criminal prosecutions. According to this understanding, the president, as
chief executive, is the chief prosecutor in charge of all federal prosecution
and has chosen to delegate this authority to lawyers within the DOJ.74
Although federal prosecutors are employed by the United States or one of its
agencies, the president, under this conception, is the federal prosecutors' boss
and, for that reason, the person with ultimate authority over federal
prosecutors' discretionary decisions-both those made on behalf of the
public as client and those made as the public's lawyer. Because the president,
in this view, takes on the full role of prosecutor, the president can make
decisions in a criminal prosecution about "means" that are ordinarily within
the province of the lawyer.
This conception evokes different ethical concerns-namely, concerns
about the improper influence of nonlawyers on the practice of law.
Preliminarily, not all presidents are lawyers. Even those who are lawyers do
not act in that capacity. They are, in essence, nonlawyers. 75 If the president
73. In some situations, a government lawyer may fulfill the up-the-ladder reporting
requirement by going over the president's head to Congress. See Note, Government Counsel
and Their Obligations, 121 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1425 (2008). But the analogy between
Congress and a private corporation's board of directors is imperfect. Confidentiality
considerations may limit prosecutors' ability to make disclosures to Congress about pending
cases and, in any event, it seems plain that, on separation-of-powers grounds, Congress could
not give direction to prosecutors.
74. There are legal and historical problems with this conception that we discuss in our
earlier paper. For instance, federal prosecution was not originally an exclusively executive
power. Private individuals and state actors brought federal criminal charges in the early
republic. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 15, 42. Further, the authority to prosecute is
delegated to federal prosecutors by congressional legislation, not by presidential decree. Id. at
35-37, 49. Here, however, we are discussing a different set of problems with this conception,
namely, those raised by prosecutors' professional obligations and by the constitutional concept
of separation of powers.
75. Most professional conduct rules are applicable only in situations where lawyers are
practicing law. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016)
(providing that lawyers rendering law-related services are not subject to the rules governing
the lawyer-client relationship if they clarify that they are not practicing law). Lawyers who
are not practicing law are regulated primarily by professional conduct rules proscribing
criminal, fraudulent, and dishonest or deceitful conduct. In some situations, even the general
rule subjecting lawyers to discipline for dishonesty and deceit is inapplicable. See, e.g., D.C.
Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 323 (2004), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/
opinions/opinion323.cfm [https://perma.cc/M4SR-MZ7X] (explaining that government
agency lawyers who are not engaged in legal representations may engage in deceit where
legally authorized in furtherance of their official duties); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op.
Comm., Op. 02-05 (2002), http://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2002-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S2FH-U4RR] (stating "that as long as a prosecutor's or other governmental
lawyer's conduct employing dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation is part of an
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is the chief prosecutor with full prosecutorial power and has delegated
authority to lawyers within the DOJ, then we run into problems analogous to
those at the heart of unauthorized practice of law provisions. A nonlawyer
cannot appear before courts, argue motions, or perform other tasks typically
reserved to lawyers.76 Nonlawyers do not have the requisite training and are
not governed by the ethics rules.77 The risk, at the heart of these provisions,
is that without proper training and with no professional commitment to the
applicable ethics code, nonlawyers will undermine the legal system rather
than uphold it.78
In general, professional norms presuppose that lawyers will exercise
"professional independence" in several senses, including independence from
nonlawyers who might impermissibly influence their conduct. 79 These
expectations are, to some extent, codified in professional conduct rules that
restrict lawyers' relationship with nonlawyers in order to prevent
relationships that would leave the lawyer susceptible to improper lay
influence. These include rules against fee splitting with nonlawyers and
against forming law partnerships with nonlawyer partners or investors. 80 The
purpose behind these rules, like that behind the prohibition on the
unauthorized practice of law, is to ensure that the integrity of the legal system
is not eroded by the private interest of individuals who owe no obligation to
the courts and may not share the same ethical responsibility to the client. 81
This is not to say that lawyers cannot be supervised by nonlawyers,
whether individuals or entities. Subject to restrictions, they obviously may
otherwise lawful government operation, the prosecutor or other governmental lawyer does not
violate" the ethical rules).
76. Most states have statutes banning the unauthorized practice of law. See Barlow F.
Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good
Neighbors--or Even Good Sense?, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 180-81, 191-92 (1980); see
also Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against "Legal Bootleggers "-the Role of
the Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Courts' Inherent Powers in the Early Twentieth
Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REv. 65, 66-68 (2009) (tracing the adoption and development of
unauthorized practice of law restrictions in the 1920s and 1930s). The ABA has an ethics rule
referencing unauthorized practice of law provisions. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.5
(AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
77. See, e.g., Rules of Admission, N.Y. CTS., http://ww2.nycourts.gov/attorneys/
admissions/rules.shtml [https://perma.cc/J7DU-EK4E] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
78. One might imagine a comparable problem if the president, invoking his authority as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, sought to fly military airplanes without a pilot's
license or, instead, sought from the ground to give direction on how a pilot should fly a plane.
The authority to make certain big military decisions does not necessarily imply the power to
make all military decisions.
79. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1
(1988); Bruce A. Green, Lawyers 'Professional Independence: Overrated or Undervalued?,
46 AKRON L. REV. 599 (2013).
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) (titled
"Professional Independence of a Lawyer" and restricting, inter alia, sharing legal fees with
nonlawyers and having nonlawyer partners and investors in law firms).
81. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary
Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values
Debate, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1115 (2000) (discussing the history and development of
professional restrictions now incorporated in ABA Model Rule 5.4).
1837
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
be. Besides working as agents of nonlawyer clients, lawyers are employed
"in-house" in corporations, not-for-profit organizations, and government
agencies. In these settings, lawyers typically provide legal services to the
entities that employ them, but, subject to restrictions, they may also provide
legal services to third parties. In either case, the entity may be headed by a
nonlawyer, who may have authority to hire or fire the lawyer and to whom
the lawyer must answer as to certain matters. But even so, employed lawyers
must exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client to
avoid lay influence on their representation. For example, a lawyer in a not-
for-profit agency providing legal assistance to its constituents may not share
client confidences with the agency's nonlawyer directors, much less take
direction from them regarding the representation of individual clients. 82
It is unclear how much influence a government lawyer may allow a
nonlawyer superior to exercise over her professional judgment in carrying
out the client's objectives. Suppose that a government lawyer served in an
executive regulatory agency headed by a nonlawyer. In this scenario, the
client is the regulatory agency, and it acts through the agency head.83 The
agency head may decide the objectives of the representation and discuss with
the lawyer how to achieve them. The lawyer may share confidential
information with the agency head and receive the agency head's views. But
conventionally, as discussed in Part I, the lawyer decides on the "means" to
carry out the client's objectives. 84 Therefore, it seems doubtful that the
82. See N.Y.C. Bar Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 1997-2 (1997),
http://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports/
detail/formal-opinion- 1997-2-confidentiality-of-information-concerning-child-abuse-or-
mistreatment-preservation-of-confidences-within-a-social-services-agency-advanced-
consent-to-the-disclosure-of-client-confidences-and-secrets [https://perma.cc/9FY9-BZQS]
(stating that "the lawyer [who] is employed by, and thus compensated by, a social services
agency" shall "represent her clients with independent professional judgment" and must "not
allow the agency to direct or regulate her professional judgment in rendering legal services to
clients").
83. W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers in the Trump Administration, 69 HASTINGS
L.J. 275, 303 (2017) ("A government lawyer's client is generally the represented agency,
exercising its authority through officers authorized to make decisions on behalf of the
agency."); see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016). For
analyses of the role and responsibilities of government agency lawyers, see generally Geoffrey
P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1293 (1987); Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency
Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1170 (2002). For analyses of the roles and responsibilities of
civil government lawyers or of government lawyers performing other specific functions on
the civil side, see generally Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can,
Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REv. 789 (2000);
Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1033
(2007); Keith A. Petty, Professional Responsibility Compliance and National Security
Attorneys: Adopting the Normative Framework of Internalized Legal Ethics, 2011 UTAH L.
REv. 1563; William H. Simon, The Professional Responsibilities of the Public Official's
Lawyer: A Case Study from the Clinton Era, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 999 (2002).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27; see also McCoy v. Alabama, 138 S. Ct.
1500, 1508 (2018) ("Trial management is the lawyer's province: Counsel provides his or her
assistance by making decisions such as 'what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary
objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence.'
Some decisions, however, are reserved for the client-notably, whether to plead guilty, waive
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agency head, as the client's representative, would be entitled to call the shots
regarding "means" or strategy-that is, regarding decisions about how to
achieve the client's ends. Nor could the agency head do so as the lawyer's
supervisor. In general, lawyers as their clients' agents determine the "means"
because of various considerations-primarily their presumed expertise, as
well as the practical difficulty of obtaining client direction as to each decision
and lawyers' own reputational interest in the quality and ethical nature of
their work. 85 The argument for lawyer decision-making is, if anything, more
compelling when the client is an entity rather than an individual because the
lawyer acts for the benefit of the entity, not the supervisor, and therefore,
when the supervisor gives direction, the entity is not necessarily assuming
the risk of bad strategic decisions. In hiring a lawyer, an entity is ordinarily
deciding to seek the benefit of the lawyer's legal judgment and expertise and
authorizing the lawyer to make decisions that lawyers conventionally
make. 86
Suppose that, in the hypothetical prosecution of a foreign national, the
president, while anticipating that the case will ultimately be dismissed,
directs the prosecutor to file nonfrivolous motions and take other steps to
delay the resolution of the case in order to sustain leverage against the nation
that is holding a U.S. citizen as a prisoner. Assuming that filing motions to
secure delay is not itself ethically proscribed,87 the question of whether to
file motions is a question of "means" not "ends," although one can debate the
relevant objective. Ordinarily, in a criminal case, the objectives include,
among others, serving the ends of the criminal law (e.g., punishing or
incapacitating some of those who commit a crime and deterring others from
committing the crime), assuring the accused a fair process, protecting the
integrity of the legal system, and conserving public resources. Questions
about whether to expedite or delay proceedings (within the bounds of the
law) and about whether and what motions to file are clearly strategic
decisions of the sort that, in civil litigation, would be entrusted to the lawyer.
One may posit that the government's principal objective in this atypical
scenario has little to do with U.S. criminal justice and that the entire
the right to a jury trial, testify in one's own behalf, and forgo an appeal." (quoting Gonzalez
v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248 (2008))).
85. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) ("Clients
normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to
be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical
matters.").
86. The argument for lawyers' professional independence seems even stronger in the
criminal context than in the civil regulatory context. Suppose, for example, that a municipality
does not elect its prosecutor but, as is sometimes the case, contracts with a private practitioner
to prosecute criminal cases. See Maybell Romero, Profit-Driven Prosecution and the
Competitive Bidding Process, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMiNOLOGY 161, 185-87 (2017). The
municipality's chief executive may nominally be the prosecutor's boss and may have authority
to hire or fire the prosecutor, but the prosecutor would not be expected to discuss individual
cases with the executive, much less to take direction from the executive about decisions in
individual cases.
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.2 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) ("A lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.").
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prosecution is a "means" to secure the return of the U.S. citizen (albeit, as
discussed above, a dubious means). But even then, although the objectives
of the litigation would be expanded, questions of timing and motions in the
litigation would still be strategic ones ordinarily entrusted to the lawyer who
is responsible for the litigation, not to the client. While the prosecutor could
take account of the public interest in securing a citizen's release, the
prosecutor could not ignore the public interests in fair criminal process and
in avoiding punishment of the innocent, and those interests would foreclose
delaying the proceedings to secure leverage with an unfriendly foreign
nation.
In general, under conventional understandings about the lawyer-client
relationship, the prosecutor would be obligated to exercise independent
professional judgment notwithstanding the prosecutor's subordinate
employment relationship to the president. 88 Most obviously, the prosecutor
could not follow direction to act illegally or unethically. For example, the
prosecutor could not follow a direction to file frivolous motions coming from
the president as his supervisor any more than from another client
representative (or client).
But even if deleterious motion practice and requests for continuances
would not be unlawful or unethical per se, the prosecutor could not
reflexively accept the president's direction. On the contrary, the prosecutor
would be expected to conclude that it runs counter to the norms and
expectations of criminal prosecution-to the concept of "seeking justice"-
to continue and prolong an individual's prosecution (and potentially prolong
his imprisonment), in anticipation that the defendant will never be convicted
and does not deserve to be, in order to serve foreign policy objectives having
nothing to do with this defendant's culpability. If a prosecutor reached that
conclusion, it would be unethical for her to follow the nonlawyer supervisor's
direction, even if that supervisor was the president. The president, as the
prosecutor's boss, could fire the prosecutor, just as a corporate chief
executive or board of directors could fire the corporation's in-house general
counsel or outside counsel. But even so, from a conventional ethics
perspective, a lawyer serving as prosecutor may not accept the nonlawyer
supervisor's direction about how to achieve the government entity client's
lawful objectives but must exercise independent professional judgment.
This means that, insofar as the president gives direction to the Attorney
General, who is plainly the president's subordinate, the Attorney General
may not simply direct the trial prosecutor to implement that direction. If the
Attorney General, as a lawyer, assumes responsibility for making "means"
decisions, he must make an independent professional judgment about how to
achieve the legitimate objectives of the representation, which, in any criminal
case, entail doing justice. The deliberative process permits giving the
president's preferences only as much weight as they appropriately deserve,
but not automatically privileging them. If the Attorney General simply
88. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
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serves in an administrative capacity as a conduit for the president's direction,
then it is the trial prosecutor or other subordinate prosecutor authorized to
conduct the representation who must engage in the requisite independent
decision-making. 89
IV. THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS DILEMMA
Our first article on the president's ability to control the DOJ argued that
prosecutors serve as an important limit on presidential power. It contributed
to a growing dialog about intrabranch checks and balances. 90 Relying on
relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent, that article concluded that Congress
has the power to allocate authority to prosecutors within the DOJ.91 By
examining the specific professional norms at issue, this Article turns to a
different but related issue: the interbranch separation-of-powers problems
that would inevitably accompany a president's decision to direct individual
prosecutorial decisions. This Part concludes that allowing the president the
power to control federal prosecutors would undermine separation of powers
by stripping courts of the ability to protect themselves from executive
encroachment. This allocation of power to the president would not further
the executive's constitutionally defined task of taking care that the laws are
enforced faithfully. Instead, it would impair the courts' ability to perform
their core function: deciding criminal cases according to fact and law.92
There are two related separation-of-powers issues raised by our discussion
of prosecutorial ethics. First, the claim of presidential power to control
criminal prosecutions interferes with the inherent authority of federal courts
and the statutory authority of state courts to regulate lawyers. There are,
therefore, two competing claims by two different branches of government
regarding the power at issue. It might not seem immediately apparent which
branch should win out or whether the branches ought to just do battle in any
89. Of course, if the Attorney General purports to exercise independent professional
judgment but apparently defaults on this responsibility, paying unquestionable obeisance to
the president, the subordinate prosecutor will have an ethical dilemma regarding whether to
accept the Attorney General's direction, as would any subordinate lawyer receiving direction
from a supervisory lawyer who appears to be acting in bad faith. How the federal prosecutor
might navigate this dilemma is an interesting question but one beyond the scope of this Article.
For purposes of this Article's analysis, we assume that all the government lawyers are
motivated to behave ethically, insofar as they can discern what professional ethics requires.
90. Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 5-6.
91. Id. at 34-38.
92. As administrative law scholars have pointed out, the formalist view of the division of
authority between the branches is difficult to apply to the modern administrative state.
Agencies combine judicial, legislative, and executive elements, and it is impossible to imagine
separating out these roles in the modern complex society. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and
Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-a Foolish Inconsistency?,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 492-93 (1987). Strauss argues that the key question is whether the
agency's relationship with the president, members of Congress, or judges undermines the
intended distribution of authority among the three. For an argument that criminal law
separation of powers ought to be treated differently from administrative agencies and ought to
follow a formalist approach, see Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal
Law, 58 STAN. L. REv. 989, 990-97 (2006).
1841
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
given case. We conclude that the conflict is illusory because the president's
power and obligation is to "take Care" that the laws are executed "faithfully."
This obligation presupposes playing by the rules.93 As we argue above, in
order to play by the rules, the president has to rely on trained prosecutors who
will follow the ethical traditions of the profession rather than assume
responsibility himself or delegate to someone else in the executive branch
who has no such professional duty and other potentially conflicting interests.
Second, if we were to allow presidential authority over law enforcement
to trump ethics rules enforced by courts and endorsed by Congress, we risk
significantly weakening an independent judiciary. If we were to assume an
anomalous world in which the president can direct prosecutors' decisions and
courts are free to sanction prosecutors for following those directions, courts
would be significantly impaired in their ability to perform their core
function-deciding individual cases according to law and fact. To exercise
this function properly, courts rely on an independent bar. Specifically, they
rely on independent prosecutors to develop and pursue cases according to
professional norms.94 While courts possess the theoretical capacity to police
these norms, doing so in practice is difficult, if not impossible. The
professional norms at issue here are more than just rules of practice. They
intersect significantly with constitutional rights and provide the backbone for
the integrity of the criminal justice system. 95 As arbiters within that system,
who are tasked with deciding cases in a fair and impartial way, judges depend
on prosecutors to follow these rules. They depend on prosecutors to provide
them with reliable facts and ensure the integrity of the system by adhering to
the norms, traditions, and ethical requirements of prosecution. Allowing a
president the power to render these norms meaningless would interfere with
the integrity and independence of the judiciary.96
Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison rested on an argument about
constitutional separation of powers. 97 Based on his understanding of the
constitutional text and history, Justice Scalia argued for a strict division of
tasks between the three branches of government. 98 In Morrison, he assumed
93. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
94. For an argument about how central norms are to democratic government, see generally
Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article I, 131 HARV. L. REv. 2187 (2018).
95. See infra Part III.B.
96. The courts' ability to protect and police the power of the judicial branch against
incursion from other branches is well established. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison);
see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) ("An informed,
independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent bar."). Emphasizing the way in
which courts depend on prosecutors does not and should not minimize the role that courts play
in policing prosecutors. Prosecutors often violate their ethical obligations, and courts are
among the important checks on such abuse, but there is a significant amount of professional
conduct that courts cannot regulate both because they must respect the boundaries of the
executive branch and because it is difficult if not impossible for courts to oversee the conduct.
97. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. Justice Scalia was a proponent of the "formalist" approach to separation of powers.
Formalists assume that the Constitution, through the vesting clauses, has completely divided
federal government authority between the three branches. Gary Lawson, Territorial
Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALiF. L. REv. 853, 857-58 (1990).
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that because prosecution is a "purely" 99 executive power, it must be exercised
by the executive branch alone.10 0 Critics of Justice Scalia's separation-of-
powers theory have argued that, in fact, he departed from the text and history
in order to further his ideological agenda of enhancing the power of the
executive at the expense of the other branches of government and did so
under the guise of an evenhanded application of the Constitution as it was
written and intended. 101
This Part adds a dimension to this critique by demonstrating how Justice
Scalia's view of prosecutorial power misinterpreted the nature of federal
prosecution (both at the founding and today) and ignores powers traditionally
exercised by Congress and the federal judiciary. While it is true that
prosecution is an executive function, it is a function that can be controlled by
Congress and overlaps significantly with the judiciary as well. 10 2 By acting
as if this is not so, Justice Scalia's dissent masked that its understanding
would impair the power of courts and the legislature to regulate prosecutors
and significantly weaken the core function of an independent judiciary. 103
This Part will take up each of these two separation-of-powers concerns in
turn.
A. The Courts' and Legislature's Power to Regulate Prosecutors
Few would suggest that a prosecutor may follow a president's direction to
break the law-for example, by suborning perjury or withholding material
exculpatory evidence. And it is unlikely that anyone would take the position
that a prosecutor may follow a president's direction to violate any and all
rules of professional conduct and judicial standards governing lawyers'
conduct. It would be perverse, for example, to argue that a prosecutor may,
Functionalists, on the other hand, believe that the Constitution is largely silent about the tasks
assigned to different branches. Given this silence, most of the work of structuring the federal
government lies with Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Peter S. Strauss, The
Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM.
L. REv. 573, 597-99 (1984). Formalists prefer a strict division of power among the branches,
and functionalists favor a balance. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REv. 1939, 1946 (2011). Functionalists also tolerate shared
responsibilities as long as they do not interfere with a "core" function of any branch. Strauss,
supra note 92, at 512-22. A third set of scholars seeks a pragmatic middle ground. They
suggest that separation-of-powers analysis should focus on preventing a single branch from
accumulating too much power and that the Constitution equips each branch with the power to
protect itself and police the others. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2000); Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial
Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SuP. CT. REv. 357, 362-65.
99. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 704-05.
101. Reisman, supra note 16, at 50-53.
102. As James Madison argued, the separation of powers does not necessarily require a
strict division of authority. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). And, in fact, some
blending of powers may ensure that one branch is able to prevent the encroachment of another.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
103. In our earlier article, we argued that characterizing prosecution as a pure executive
power is not in keeping with the history of prosecution in the early American republic. Green
& Roiphe, supra note 2, at 12-15.
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much less must, lie to the court (or to anyone else) if the president so directs.
Even so, there is no caveat in the theory of complete presidential control over
prosecution that makes this point clear, and it is at least conceivable that a
president might respond as then-former President Nixon did in an interview
with the journalist David Frost, "when the President does it, that means that
it is not illegal." 104
But even if one were to take the more modest view that the president
cannot direct a prosecutor to break the law or violate core ethical principles,
the professional conduct norms discussed in Parts II and III may seem, at first
blush, less important. As discussed above, the premise that the president may
make all decisions in any given federal prosecution would not require
prosecutors to violate rules directly governing relations with the court or third
parties. Rather, presidential control potentially conflicts with professional
conduct rules and norms governing lawyers' relationship with clients,
particularly entity clients, concerning questions about who makes decisions
and how decisions are to be made.
The professional rules concerning entity representation and nonlawyer
influence were not embodied in common-law agency decisions but
developed well after the Constitution was written.105 There is no reason to
believe that the constitutional framers expected prosecutors to be bound by
these specific rules in whatever interactions they might have with the
president. But, at the core, the professional conduct rules in question
implement a notion of lawyers' professional independence that has been
fundamental to the role of the American lawyer since this country's
founding. 106 It would be hard to make a principled argument that the
presidential authority to direct federal prosecutions is subordinate to
professional conduct rules in general but that these particular rules are an
exception. Nor could it plausibly be argued that prosecutors' independence
is less important than that of other lawyers.
In order to perform their work adequately, courts assume that prosecutors
treat similar cases alike and exclude illegitimate considerations in
prosecuting cases. Ethics rules, customs, and practices of prosecutors'
offices help ensure this is so. Unlike career prosecutors, the president would
not decide against the background of prior decisions and DOJ traditions and
probably cannot avoid interjecting impermissible considerations. The
federal court's deference to prosecutors' exercise of discretion presupposes
104. See supra note 26; see also Excerpts from Interview with Richard Nixon About
Domestic Effects of Indochina War, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A16. President Trump's
lawyers have implied that they may share this view. Letter from Marc E. Kasowitz to Robert
S. Mueller, supra note 1. The president has also implied this himself. Excerpts from Trump's
Interview with the Times, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/
us/politics/trump-interview-excerpts.html [https://perma.cc/FBJ4-3WYL] ("I have absolute
right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department.").
105. Roger N. Walter, An Overview of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
24 WASHBURN L.J. 443, 444-45 (1985).
106. Gordon, supra note 79, at 30-68; Green, supra note 68, at 602-08.
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prosecutors' professional commitment to seeking justice and to the norms,
rules, and traditions that promote and protect that pursuit. 107
This assumption about prosecutors' conduct both supports and presumes
prosecutorial independence. 108 Of course, at times, courts do have to
question whether prosecutors are behaving ethically. But as a general matter,
the presumption that they are committed to the traditional norms of
prosecution allows prosecutors to do their job. 109 It makes their work easier
because, for example, judges generally take prosecutors at their word and
assume that there is probable cause to support their arrests and indictments.
If the DOJ takes the position that the president may control it and courts do
not know when the president has directly intervened in discretionary
decisions, prosecutors may lose the benefit of the presumption in all cases.
Not knowing whether prosecutors are or are not adhering to the traditional
expectations in any given case, courts may mistrust them in all cases, making
it harder for prosecutors to do their job and significantly altering (and likely
undermining) the criminal process. 110
Ethics rules governing prosecutorial conduct in general, and
disinterestedness in particular, are not only professional norms, but also a key
tool in the administration of justice and therefore fundamental to a
functioning independent judiciary. While superficially appealing in its
simplicity, Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison overlooks the complexity of
government functioning in general and prosecution in particular. In claiming
that prosecution is a pure executive power, Justice Scalia misrepresented the
early history of prosecution in this country, which demonstrates a complex
tradition in which federal prosecution was shared by private individuals,
states, and to some extent the judiciary.I 1  It is not surprising then that he
107. Fish, supra note 19, at 238-44; Green, supra note 44, at 618-37.
108. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423-24 (1976) ("The office of public prosecutor
is one which must be administered with courage and independence. Yet how can this be if the
prosecutor is made subject to suit by those whom he accuses and fails to convict? To allow
this would open the way for unlimited harassment and embarrassment of the most
conscientious officials by those who would profit thereby. There would be involved in every
case the possible consequences of a failure to obtain a conviction. There would always be a
question of possible civil action in case the prosecutor saw fit to move dismissal of the
case.... The apprehension of such consequences would tend toward great uneasiness and
toward weakening the fearless and impartial policy which should characterize the
administration of this office. The work of the prosecutor would thus be impeded and we would
have moved away from the desired objective of stricter and fairer law enforcement."
(alteration in original) (quoting Pearson v. Reed, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935))).
109. See id. at 422-23.
110. If courts were to develop a practice of asking prosecutors to reveal whether or not their
decisions are their own or those of the administration, this too could put prosecutors in an
ethical bind. If the president is akin to the representative of a client, then revealing the
information might be a violation of confidences. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6
(AM. BAR Ass'N 2016). If the president is a nonlawyer employer, then the prosecutor may
well face employment consequences for answering.
111. Justice Scalia's inaccurate treatment of history leads to a distorted view of the three
branches of government. Many scholars have pointed out how blended the obligations of the
different branches were. Federal prosecution was shared by private individuals and states.
See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 70; Krent, supra note 7, at 290-310; Reisman,
supra note 16, at 50-51. Historians have shown that the obligations of different branches were
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glossed over the contemporary and deeply rooted reality that the judiciary
shares an important part of the prosecution function by, among other things,
regulating prosecutors' conduct. By fiat, Justice Scalia's approach would
transfer the entire law enforcement function to the executive branch in
general and to the president in particular. Under the guise of neutrally
applying the text and history of the Constitution, his theory would in fact
alter the balance between the three branches by shifting power from the
federal courts and Congress to the executive.
One can rationalize presidential authority over federal prosecutors on the
theory that while the president's executive power does not displace all
professional conduct rules, it supersedes those particular contemporary rules
that have the effect of limiting or impeding the president's authority to direct
the conduct of criminal prosecutions. In other words, if court-adopted rules
or standards have the effect of denying the president the ability to make
otherwise-lawful prosecution decisions by putting prosecutors at risk of
discipline for complying with the president's decisions, then the rules or
standards are preempted by Article II of the Constitution.
The argument seems to set up a direct constitutional conflict between
executive branch authority, on one hand, and both judicial and congressional
authority, on the other. That is because the professional conduct rules and
standards are expressions of both judicial and legislative power.
In general, prosecutors, as lawyers, are subject to the supervisory authority
of both the courts that have licensed them and, if different, the courts before
which they appear. 112  Thus, federal prosecutors are subject to the
professional conduct rules of their licensing jurisdictions and the rules and
court-made law of the federal courts in which they prosecute. 113 For the most
part, prosecutors accept the relevance of these various norms. Although
federal courts are highly deferential to prosecutors' discretionary decision-
making, particularly as to charging and plea bargaining, 114 prosecutors have
shared from the outset in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Christine A. Desan, The
Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition,
111 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1383-84 (1998).
112. Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce
Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 69, 73-74 (1995).
113. Federal courts have broad common-law authority "to supervise and discipline lawyers
who appear before them." Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the
Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 485, 530-31 (1989). In addition, federal
courts have general supervisory authority over the conduct of criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). For a discussion of the supervisory
power of courts in criminal cases, see generally Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power
of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 324 (2006); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority
of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984); Alfred Hill, The Bill ofRights and the
Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181 (1969); and Lisa H. Wallach, Prosecutorial
Misconduct in the Grand Jury: Dismissal of Indictments Pursuant to the Federal Supervisory
Power, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 129, 135-39 (1987).
114. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 (1978) (deferring to prosecutors' decisions
in plea bargaining); United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that judges should not engage in detailed oversight of prosecutors' decisions in plea
bargaining and charging); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-
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not persuaded courts that, as executive branch officials, they are not bound
by the court's professional regulation. 115
The question of whether federal prosecutors are exempt from certain areas
of professional regulation was litigated most vigorously several decades ago
in the context of the professional conduct rule restricting lawyers' direct
communications with represented persons. 116 Invoking this rule, some courts
concluded that prosecutors and their investigators may be restricted from
conducting otherwise-lawful questioning of represented suspects or
defendants without their lawyers' consent. 117 Anticipating that additional
courts might adopt restrictive readings of the rules, the DOJ issued a
memorandum, known as the Thomburgh Memo, which purported to
authorize federal prosecutors to undertake investigative measures in potential
derogation of the professional conduct rules. 118 When courts questioned the
policy's authority, the DOJ responded by implementing the federal
rulemaking process to promulgate a federal regulation, known as the Reno
Regulation, to similar effect. 119 The Eighth Circuit held that the Reno
Regulation was unenforceable, 120 and the DOJ abandoned its reliance on the
regulation soon thereafter when Congress adopted a law, known as the
McDade Amendment, 121 which requires federal prosecutors to abide by the
professional conduct rules of the states in which they prosecute. 122
In other contexts, questions might be raised regarding which body, as
between state courts, federal courts, or Congress, should establish and
enforce professional conduct regulation for federal prosecutors. Depending
on the subject of the regulation, one or the other may have a stronger claim. 123
For example, the federal courts before which prosecutors appear may have
the stronger claim to apply their professional conduct rules for trial lawyers
in order to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings; state courts may have
the stronger claim to apply rules relating generally to prosecutors' character
and fitness to practice law; and Congress may have the stronger claim to
adopt legislation, such as the Jencks Act, 124 that explicitly regulates the
conduct of criminal prosecutions. In this case, however, the question of how
80 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that, based on separation of powers, courts will not review a
prosecutor's decision not to bring charges).
115. Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1357 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming the
court's power to regulate federal prosecutors).
116. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors,
88 GEO. L.J. 207, 211-14 (2000).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1988).
118. Memorandum from Richard L. Thornburgh, Att'y Gen. of the United States, to All
Justice Dep't Litigators (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489-93
(D.N.M. 1992).
119. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1995).
120. United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th
Cir. 1998).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2012).
122. Zacharias & Green, supra note 116, at 211-16 (describing the legislative history and
substance of the McDade Amendment).
123. See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 13.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012).
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to allocate authority among these regulatory bodies is of no moment because
all three have regulated in essentially the same way-state and federal courts
through the adoption of similar sets of rules, and Congress through the
McDade Amendment-and, therefore, federal prosecutors are not subject to
inconsistent regulation. The question, instead, is whether any or all of these
bodies may adopt regulations for prosecutors, as lawyers, that have the effect
of frustrating presidential control of federal criminal prosecutions.
In general, executive branch action must take place within the bounds of
the law-that is, within the bounds of legislation or, in litigation, law made
by judges pursuant to their inherent or rulemaking authority. 125 Here, the
law in question regulates lawyers and is not specifically directed at
government lawyers, though it has implications for them. At a level of
generality, it seems obvious that lawyer regulation is among the laws within
the confines of which the executive branch must function. A sweeping claim
that the president, or the executive branch in general, is above, or unbound
by, the law that regulates lawyers in criminal proceedings would have little
credibility. 126 The Constitution assigns the president the task to "take Care"
that the laws are faithfully executed. 127
Proponents of presidential power over criminal prosecutions might argue
that the law here is different because, while directed at lawyers generally and
therefore applicable to lawyers in the executive branch, the particular
professional conduct rules do not restrict action. They regulate how
decisions to act are made. Their effect in criminal prosecutions is arguably
to regulate how decision-making authority is allocated within the executive
branch and the criteria governing otherwise lawful decisions. No doubt,
Congress can define crimes and restrict how the executive branch
investigates and proves them, and courts can restrict prosecutors' in-court
conduct, all of which may have the effect of limiting executive branch
authority. But one might argue that it is a greater intrusion, and different in
kind, to dictate the internal decision-making process and criteria for decisions
that are entrusted to the executive branch. 128
We find this argument unpersuasive. To begin with, it misconceives the
ethics rules in question. The rules are not fundamentally different from
others adopted by courts to regulate lawyers' professional conduct in the
courtroom. The rules are prophylactic ones that protect the lawyer from third
parties' improper influences-that of the client's faithless fiduciary or the
lawyer's nonlawyer supervisor. But many rules are prophylactic, including
125. See Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REv.
777, 807 (2012).
126. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974); United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) ("No man in this country is so high that he is above the law.").
127. U.S. CONSr. art. II, § 3; see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
128. There are certainly precedents for such restrictions. For example, federal legislation
allowing some juveniles to be tried in federal court rather than transferred to state authorities
sets the criteria for prosecutors' decisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012). For an argument that
federal courts' supervisory powers should not extend beyond the courtroom, see generally
Beale, supra note 113, at 1520-22.
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those governing conflicts of interest. 129 At the core, these rules, like the
conflict of interest rules, protect the fundamental professional value of
lawyer fidelity to the client. 130 And in the context of prosecution, where the
client is the public, they ensure the integrity of the case.
The importance of the ethics rules discussed above relates to the second
separation-of-powers concern, which we discuss next.
B. Undermining a Core Function of an Independent Judiciary
Stripping states, Congress, and the federal courts of the ability to regulate
prosecutors would violate the constitutional separation-of-powers principles
by undermining the core power of courts to decide criminal cases according
to fact and law. Judicial independence was just as central at the founding as
executive power. 131 Justice Scalia in his dissent in Morrison ignored how
his theory of presidential control over federal prosecution would affect the
judiciary. At the very least, this consequence ought to factor into any
separation-of-powers analysis. If not, what seems an uncontroversial textual
reading of discrete executive power is masking what is, in fact, a significant
diminution of the judicial role.
In the context of prosecution in particular, the rules regarding a lawyer's
independence from the client play a far more foundational role than it might
at first seem to. They serve to promote and ensure prosecutors' "duty to do
justice," a principle recognized by the Court in Berger.132 This duty dates
back long before the founding and was clearly intended to be a central part
of American criminal justice. 133 The rules discussed in the first three parts
of the Article are not merely etiquette for lawyers, but rather a way of
ensuring disinterested decision-making, which is not only a key professional
norm but also fundamental to the proper functioning of the judiciary. As the
129. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role,
65 FORDHAM L. REv. 71, 104 (1996) ("[T]he conflict of interest rules are prophylactic
rules .... They do not proscribe conduct that is necessarily harmful in itself, but protect
against the occurrence of various harms."); cf Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v.
Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 449 (1947) ("[The banking law's conflict of interest rule] is not
concerned, of course, with any showing that the director in question has in fact been derelict
in his duties or has in any way breached his fiduciary obligation to the bank. It is a preventive
or prophylactic measure.").
130. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
131. See generally SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS
OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606-1787, at 27-37 (2011).
132. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). For an argument that the prosecutor's duty to do justice,
including the duty to engage in disinterested decision-making protected by the rules discussed
in Parts II and III, is critical to the administration ofjustice, see Eric S. Fish, Against Adversary
Prosecution, 103 IOwA L. REv. 1419, 1422 (2018).
133. Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845) ("[The prosecutor] is expressly bound by
his official oath to behave himself in his office of attorney with all due fidelity to the court as
well as the client; and he violates it when he consciously presses for an unjust judgment: much
more so when he presses for the conviction of an innocent man."); Fish, supra note 19, at 238-
44; Green, supra note 44, at 612-19. For discussions of Rush v. Cavenaugh, see Russell G.
Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 241, 257-58 (1992); Zacharias & Green, supra note 66, at 6-11.
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Court held in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,134 "An informed,
independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent bar." 135  In
Velazquez, the Court invalidated restrictions that conditioned the petitioner's
funding on its willingness to forgo challenges to certain welfare regulations
as impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 136 The professional norms at
issue here are at least as important to maintaining and nurturing an
independent bar, which, as the Court explained, is necessary for the
functioning of an independent judiciary. 137 These prosecutorial norms help
to ensure that investigations and prosecutions are conducted in a proper and
evenhanded way and that the facts developed in an investigation and
judgments about the relevance of those facts are trustworthy. 138 This
particular form of disinterested decision-making is unlikely and perhaps even
impossible for a president to employ given the conflicting demands of the
president's other duties, the president's conflicting policy and political
commitments, and the president's lack of training, experience, and expertise
in prosecutorial decision-making.
In the case of prosecutors, the core value of professional independence
implicates the integrity of the criminal justice system and the courts as a
whole. The effect of the rules in the context of criminal prosecutions, as
discussed, has been to ensure disinterested prosecutorial decision-making in
accordance with both the judicial expectation and the prosecutorial tradition
of "seeking justice." To a degree, the obligation to seek justice is elaborated
in the professional conduct rules. 139 To a greater degree, judicial opinions
have elaborated on prosecutors' distinctive professional obligations, which
are rooted in this general concept. 140 Courts' supervision of criminal
prosecutions has built up around the assumption that prosecutors' offices are
committed to this understanding. 14 1 Stripped of their ability to rely on
independent prosecutors playing by the rules, courts would be significantly
134. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
135. Id. at 534. The Court in Velazquez drew on First Amendment law to strike down the
restrictions at issue. Id. at 537. While the First Amendment does not apply here, the reasoning
is similar. In our hypothetical, prosecutors directed by the president would be unable to
provide the court with critical information-that they do not believe the evidence warrants a
prosecution.
136. Id. at 547-49.
137. Id. at 545.
138. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2015).
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
140. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
141. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 32, at 55 (noting that, inBerger v. United States,
the Court "echoed the public's confidence that prosecutors will faithfully observe their
obligations to play fairly and seek justice"); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) ("[O]ur system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated
unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states the proposition
candidly for the federal domain: 'The United States wins its point whenever justice is done
its citizens in the courts."').
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hobbled in one of their central functions, namely, checking the power of the
executive and preventing prosecutorial overreach. 142
Judicial expectations of prosecutors are not particularly focused on
presidential authority. In elaborating expectations for prosecutors, courts
have never seriously considered that the president might seek to assert
decision-making authority in federal criminal cases even occasionally, much
less routinely. Insofar as judges address charging decisions, trial decisions,
and other prosecution decisions, their concern is not with who makes
decisions, since it has always been assumed that prosecutors will make them,
but with how decisions are made-with what considerations may and may
not legitimately be considered. Presidential control over prosecution would
mean that federal courts, unlike state courts, cannot dictate that prosecutors,
as lawyers responsible for criminal prosecutions, bring and try criminal cases
consistently with the expectations that have built up over the course of two
centuries around the idea of seeking justice.
Federal courts are, for instance, reluctant to use their supervisory power
over the grand jury process. This is to protect the independence of that
process, which is separate from the three branches of government. 143 But
courts do have an obligation to ensure the integrity of their proceedings. 144
In justifying their standoffishness, courts invoke the professional obligations
of prosecutors. 145 The integrity of the grand jury is policed, at the outskirts,
by courts. But it is ensured by a corps of professional prosecutors who pursue
investigations and indictments for legitimate reasons, not partisan purposes
or personal gain.146 If prosecutors are subject to presidential control and, as
a general matter, are no longer making discretionary decisions according to
professional norms, one of the premises for judicial restraint in exercise of
its supervisory power will be lacking.
Overlooking this implication of presidential control over prosecution risks
altering the balance of powers significantly. If courts cannot rely on
prosecutors to make decisions in a disinterested manner, then they are
compromised in their ability to interpret the law and apply it to the facts.
Returning to our hypothetical, a court considering the case of the foreign
national has no way of knowing that the charging decision departed from the
well-worn tradition that prosecutors will not charge someone if they do not
believe that person is guilty. 147 The judge who presides over the case will
142. Prakash, supra note 6, at 568 (arguing that, in 1789, "Americans viewed judging, in
part, as a check on the executive's law enforcement").
143. United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1477-78 (10th Cir. 1987).
144. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (explaining that the preservation
of the integrity of the judicial process is one of the justifications for the use of judicial
supervisory power).
145. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 700 F. Supp. 626, 630 (D.P.R. 1988).
146. Id.
147. If presidential control over prosecutorial decision-making became the norm, perhaps
courts could require prosecutors to reveal this fact. This would potentially introduce new
problems. First, it would not solve the problem if the president orders a prosecutor not to
pursue a case the prosecutor otherwise found compelling. Second, if the president is the
representative of an entity client, as we analyze in Part II, the prosecutor would be ethically
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probably assume prosecutorial disinterestedness in making key rulings.
While the defense will hopefully provide an important check, which could
lead to the correct outcome, courts in the criminal justice system also rely on
the prosecutor pursuing justice, not only criminal convictions, in reaching the
right result. 148
In the context of a prosecution with partisan political implications, the
concern is even greater. In our hypothetical case with foreign policy
implications, the president has interests that are different from and potentially
in conflict with the principles that ought to inform decisions in criminal cases.
Even more so in an investigation or prosecution of a federal executive
official, as in Morrison, the president likely has an interest that directly
conflicts with the principles governing disinterested prosecution. 149
Congress enacts laws that are meant to apply to everyone, including the
cabinet and the president himself. 150 The judiciary is supposed to apply those
laws in particular circumstances. The courts would be significantly
compromised in this power if they were deprived of the ability to regulate
federal prosecutors to ensure disinterested decision-making.
One could argue that most presidents will likely do the right thing and do
their part to ensure the integrity of the system, but prosecutorial decisions are
made in private with no transparency-if a president chooses to exercise
prosecutorial power, there is little way to ensure the propriety of his
decisions. Political scientists have argued that political actors in general and
the president in particular are responsible for sustaining the legitimacy of the
courts and judicial review. 151 Keith Whittington, for instance, writes, "For
the Court to compete successfully, other political actors must have reasons
for allowing the Court to 'win."' 152 Because presidents have the incentive to
either undermine or buttress judicial supremacy (depending on the political
climate of the day), it is more important for the public to know whether the
president is making decisions in a criminal case and on what basis. If a
president were to decide to institute or halt a criminal case for illegitimate,
self-interested reasons, such as protecting his political party's power or his
own well-being (thereby weakening the role of courts), this fact would
remain opaque, inaccessible to Congress, the courts themselves, or the
public. 153 The president would thus weaken the judiciary without anyone
barred from making this disclosure without the president's permission. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016). If the president is the prosecutor's supervisor,
as we analyze in Part III, then the disclosure may be permissible under the rules, but the
prosecutor could (and possibly would) be fired for insubordination.
148. Fish, supra note 19, at 244-48.
149. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988).
150. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974); United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
151. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 5
(2007).
152. Id. at 26.
153. Drawing on Stephen Skowronek's taxonomy, Whittington argues that "preemptive"
presidents, who manage to win an election despite their opposition to a popular and vibrant
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ever knowing. In order for the political process to do its part in shaping the
role of the judiciary, the relationship between the president and the courts
must be transparent. Whenever branches of government vie for power, which
presidential control over prosecution clearly involves, the facts must be clear
to all. Without independent, disinterested prosecutors, we can never be sure
that those facts are discovered, let alone made public.
The executive branch's interest in preserving its power in this area derives
from its obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. 154 The
DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has recognized that preserving the
integrity of prosecutorial decision-making is fundamental to this Article II
task. 155 The president's control over prosecutors, which is-as we explained
above-itself fundamentally at odds with the integrity of prosecutorial
decision-making, renders the justification for separation of powers moot.
This sort of control is at odds with the rationale for the separation of powers
since the executive is supposed to preserve the integrity of criminal law
enforcement in general and prosecutorial decision-making in particular, not
erode it.
CONCLUSION: DOES IT MATTER?
Suppose we are right that ethics rules and norms, unless preempted by
Article II of the Constitution, restrict the extent to which federal prosecutors
may follow presidential directions in individual criminal cases. What
follows for federal prosecutors?
As a preliminary matter, there is a question of how the president would
communicate his command. The DOJ has adhered to norms and regulations
designed to protect prosecutorial independence from White House
interference since Watergate. Pursuant to this protocol, the president is
allowed to communicate only through the Attorney General. 156 It is unclear
political regime, are more likely to challenge the court's authority and diminish the power of
judicial review. Id. at 22-24; see also STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 34-45 (1993). Political actors depend on
an independent judiciary to provide information so they can carry out their jobs properly.
James R. Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game ofLegislative-Judicial
Interaction, 45 Am. J. POL. SCI. 84, 84 (2001).
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
155. Assertion of Exec. Privilege Concerning the Special Counsel's Interviews of the Vice
President & Senior White House Staff, 32 Op. O.L.C. 7, 10 (2008) (arguing that limits on
congressional oversight are justified because of the executive branch interest in preserving the
integrity of prosecutorial decision-making); see also Response to Congressional Requests for
Info. Regarding Decisions Made Under the Indep. Counsel Act, 10 Op. O.L.C. 68, 75-78
(1986).
156. Griffin Bell, U.S. Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Address Before Department of Justice
Lawyers (Sept. 6, 1978) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/09-06-1978b.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7CP-9RVL]); Memorandum
from Benjamin R. Civiletti, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Heads of Offices, Bds., Bureaus & Divs.,
Communication from the White House and Congress (Oct. 18, 1979), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/10-18-1979.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ3T-JNGD];
Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President, Office of White House
Counsel, to White House Staff, Communications Restrictions with Personnel at the
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whether these norms would be eliminated under the new regime. Under a
theory in which the president has complete control over prosecution, the
president could simply order their retraction. But the overhaul demonstrates
what a radical departure this would be from policies and practices that have
defined the DOJ for at least decades. President Trump's unprecedented use
of Twitter to communicate demands and instructions raises the further
question of whether or not individual prosecutors or the Attorney General
would have to consider these more informal communications specific orders
or at least factor them into any decision. 157
The prosecutor will have to decide whether to follow the president's
direction, which will be determined in part by whether the prosecutor
concludes that the president generally has the claimed authority to control
federal prosecutions. If the OLC, which is responsible for advising the
government on constitutional and other legal questions, concludes that the
president generally possesses the claimed authority, some might expect
federal prosecutors to go along. 158 It would be unexpected for each to
independently resolve the constitutional question. While scholarly literature
on the question may expand, prosecutors would not be expected to determine
who has the better argument. In general, subordinate lawyers may defer to
supervising lawyers' reasonable resolutions of arguable questions of
professional duty. 159 On the question of presidential power, subordinate
prosecutors would likely just defer to the DOJ's view. Likewise, an Attorney
General appointed by the president would be comfortable deferring to
presidential decision-making if OLC says he may do so.
Less clear will be how a prosecutor should respond when the president's
direction seems to be at odds with DOJ policy and practice, conventional
prosecutorial norms, or the developed understandings about what it means to
"seek justice." Perhaps OLC will take the position that, as a constitutional
matter, presidential authority over criminal prosecutions supersedes
Department of Justice (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015a-dde8-d23c-
a7ff-dfef4d530000 [https://perma.cc/7CBE-2ES5ac].
157. For instance, on May 20, 2018, President Trump tweeted, "I hereby demand, and will
do so officially tomorrow, that the Department of Justice look into whether or not the FBI/DOJ
infiltrated or surveilled the Trump Campaign for Political Purposes .... " Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 20, 2018, 10:37 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/998256454590193665 [https://perma.cc/J968-ZWZ3]. If the
president failed to follow up officially, it is unclear whether this would count as a direction
that individual prosecutors would be required to follow. For a discussion of whether a
presidential tweet counts as an interpretation of the law, see Jim Baker, Donald Trump, Twitter
and Presidential Power to Interpret the Law for the Executive Branch, LAWFARE (Aug. 24,
2018, 10:35 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/donald-trump-twitter-and-presidential-
power-interpret-law-executive-branch [https://perma.cc/TX8J-847Z].
158. For a more skeptical view of prosecutors' potential for independence, see Norman W.
Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REv.
409, 445 (2011) ("[T]he structure [of the DOJ] tilts so heavily in favor of secrecy, centralized
control, partisan appointment and removal, and political accountability that there is almost no
support for even the most modest and uncontroversial form of professional
independence ... ").
159. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.2 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
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professional norms and ethics rules, so that prosecutors must follow
presidential direction unless he directs them to act illegally (including
unconstitutionally). Or perhaps OLC will put forth a more nuanced view of
the extent to which federal prosecutors must implement the president's
commands. 160 In part, this scenario will test whether the DOJ's conventional
understandings, traditions, and practices regarding federal prosecutors' role
in seeking justice is more powerful for prosecutors than the tradition of
deference to supervisory authority. 161
Suppose that the DOJ takes the view that prosecutors must defer to the
president as to lawful acts. While prosecutors may counsel against decisions
with which they disagree, they would likely not find it difficult to carry those
decisions out. As a general matter, it is probably not unusual for federal
prosecutors to disagree with the decisions of supervisory prosecutors and, as
an ordinary matter, if the action dictated is not unlawful, subordinate
prosecutors carry out the directions. In rare cases, prosecutors might ask to
be removed from a case, and in exceedingly rare cases, prosecutors might
resign rather than implement a decision with which they strongly disagree or
simply ignore instructions. 162 But prosecutors understand that there is a
prosecutorial hierarchy, that there is room for disagreement on questions of
judgment and that there is, as a general matter, nothing wrong with carrying
out decisions different from one's own.
If the DOJ takes the position that prosecutors must defer to the president,
ethics questions will contribute modestly, at most, to a decision of the
Attorney General or a subordinate prosecutor regarding whether to do so
when a presidential direction sharply conflicts with DOJ policy or with the
prosecutor's view of whatjustice requires. Even assuming that a professional
conduct rule forecloses prosecutorial acquiescence, disciplinary authorities
almost certainly would not proceed against prosecutors, given both the
practical and constitutional uncertainty about the application of the rules. As
a general matter, disciplinary actions against prosecutors are rare. 163
Disciplinary actions against prosecutors are rarer still where, as here, the
relevant standard of conduct is uncertain.
Nor would a federal court be likely to employ the ethics rules as a predicate
for dismissing an indictment or taking other action in a criminal case. Federal
courts are deferential to prosecutors, particularly on questions of
prosecutorial discretion, and reluctant to use their supervisory authority to
160. The OLC does not have a history of impartial, nonpartisan decision-making. See. e.g.,
Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM.
L. REv. 1681, 1694-709 (2005) (criticizing the reasoning in the OLC "torture memos," written
by John Yoo and Jay Bybee, which supported the administration's use of waterboarding and
other extreme interrogation techniques).
161. For an extensive discussion of this type of dilemma for federal government employees
in the contemporary context, see generally Keith A. Petty, Duty and Disobedience: The
Conflict of Conscience and Compliance in the Trump Era, 45 PEPP. L. REv. 55 (2018).
162. See David Luban, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 1-3 (2010)
(discussing an example of a New York City prosecutor).
163. Green, supra note 112, at 92; Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of
Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REv. 721, 743-62 (2001).
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restrict prosecutors' action. Unless a court concluded that the prosecutor's
action was unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful, it would be reluctant to
intrude into the prosecutor's decision or decision-making process. 164
In fact, there is little reason to think the court would ever know that the
president was behind a particular charging decision or strategic choice. If a
prosecutor were to acquiesce to a president's order either because the OLC
had implemented a policy of deferring to presidential edict or because the
prosecutor believed it was her individual obligation to do so, the court would
never know that the prosecutor who was closest to the facts had determined
independently that the prosecution was unjustified. In our hypothetical
scenario, 165 the court would preside over a prosecution of the foreign official
and, unaware of the administration's motivations for the prosecution and
doubts about the defendant's guilt, the court would likely remand the
defendant pending the trial and accede to the prosecution's delaying tactics.
In this scenario, the judiciary would be complicit by lending not only its
authority but also its legitimacy to the defendant's incarceration, until the
government achieved its foreign policy objective or the case was otherwise
resolved. It would have assisted the executive in carrying out a foreign policy
objective, but it would have done so by compromising the core function of
courts to uncover the truth and apply the law to the facts in an evenhanded
way. The judiciary's power to protect itself from the encroachment of the
executive would be diminished, an outcome that does not comport with any
theory about three coequal branches of government. 166
On the other hand, it is conceivable that an Attorney General or other
federal prosecutor would opt instead to defy a presidential direction, as
famously occurred in 1973 during Watergate when Attorney General Elliot
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus resigned
rather than obey President Nixon's order to fire independent special
prosecutor Archibald Cox. 167 If so, ethics rules may have some rhetorical
164. One possible constitutional argument in support of a motion to dismiss would be that
the defendant was denied the right to a disinterested prosecutor. Although the Court has not
yet determined whether or not this is an element of due process, some lower federal courts and
state courts have recognized that there is a constitutional right to a disinterested prosecutor,
while denying a remedy absent extreme prosecutorial bias. See, e.g., Wright v. United States,
732 F.2d 1048, 1057 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting the appellant's due process claim but noting
that other circuits recognize such claims); In re Goodman, 210 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. App.
2006) (applying due process framework); Green & Roiphe, supra note 36, at 488-89. Where
a prosecutor followed the president's direction to forgo criminal charges rather than to initiate
them, it is unclear whether anyone would have standing to challenge the decision or a legal
ground to do so. See Stuart P. Green, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model
Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 488 & n.2 (1988) (citing Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)).
165. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the meaning of separation of powers, see Jeremy Waldron,
Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, 54 B.C. L. REv. 433, 459-66 (2013); see also
supra notes 87, 89 and accompanying text.
167. Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at Al. More recently, President Trump dismissed Sally Yates
from her position as Acting Attorney General for refusing to defend his travel ban in court.
Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Fires Acting Attorney General Who Defied Him, N.Y. TIMES
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force in the prosecutor's defense. The prosecutor would not be limited to
arguing that the president lacks the asserted constitutional authority. The
prosecutor could further argue in certain cases, such as the foreign policy
scenario set out above, that she has ethical obligations, codified in the rules
discussed above and furthering the standard set out in Berger to "seek
justice," which conflict with her carrying out the president's instruction.
If this happened on a broad scale-a thought experiment to be sure-and
prosecutors throughout the DOJ recused themselves from a particular case,
perhaps the president's goal of controlling the outcome of that case would be
thwarted. If, in an even more unlikely scenario, the president sought to exert
his control over all cases, intervening here and there not for criminal justice
purposes but rather to further assert his will and political power, it is at least
possible that all or most federal prosecutors could resign rather than shirk
their ethical obligations. Federal prosecution might become such an
unpalatable job for well-trained lawyers devoted to the quality and ethical
caliber of their work that it would be hard or even impossible to attract well-
qualified lawyers to this job. If so, ironically, the president might be thwarted
in his ability to execute the laws.
If the propriety of presidential control of criminal prosecutions is not a
question for courts to resolve through their application of professional
conduct rules or their interpretation of the Constitution, but is principally a
question for presidents to resolve as a matter of self-restraint, for Congress,
and for the voting public, then the resolution may not be clear. Constitutional
arguments for presidential power over prosecutions predicated on the idea of
a "unitary executive" have simplicity and intuitive appeal. But so do
countervailing arguments that a president cannot ask a prosecutor to violate
her ethical and professional obligations. This argument should resonate with
professionals and others who believe in the primacy of professional
obligation. The countervailing claim that presidential power somehow
preempts professional obligation is not, at a level of generality, very
appealing. Further, the more nuanced constitutional argument, that
presidential power trumps only certain professional regulations including
those here, may be hard to understand. But even if it is a matter to be decided
by the political will of the people, presidential control of prosecutors'
decisions may not be transparent. The public might assume that presidents
are abiding by the long tradition of independence and protecting the
independent judiciary when in fact the opposite is true. It is hard for the
public to assert its political will if it does not know how decisions are being
made.
Even if the public could police the president, presidential power over
federal prosecutions threatens an independent judiciary. In order to pursue
the public interest by applying the law to facts in individual cases, the
judiciary is dependent on disinterested prosecutors. Many rules governing
prosecutors' conduct are designed to ensure that prosecutors serve justice
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-immigration-ban-
memo.html [https://perma.cc/L93K-SN7D].
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rather than individual interests or some other illegitimate end. Presidential
control over prosecutions threatens this equilibrium. It directly interferes
with the courts' ability both to regulate prosecutors according to ethics rules
and judicial standards and to rely on the professional norms of prosecutors to
ensure that prosecutors are policing themselves.
We previously argued that the president has no statutory or constitutional
authority to control prosecutorial decision-making. 168 Here, we play out the
consequences of the competing view, expressed by President Trump's
lawyers, Justice Scalia in his dissent in Morrison, and various scholars, that
the president has absolute control over the DOJ. We have shown that
exercising such control would lead to the abdication of established
prosecutorial norms and ethical requirements, which, in turn, would
undermine the proper functioning of the judiciary. This ensuing chaos offers
additional support for our argument that while the president should set broad
policy objectives and communicate those priorities to the Attorney General,
the president cannot exercise control over prosecutors' decisions in
individual cases, even when those cases have foreign policy implications.
Any argument to preserve prosecutorial independence from presidential
incursion must be mindful of the dangers involved. Independent prosecutors
are far from perfect. They sometimes abuse their discretion and violate their
obligations to the public. The challenge is to check abuses by leaving
different parties in charge of those decisions that they are best suited to make.
Discretionary decisions in criminal prosecutions are best left to trained and
experienced professionals, who are policed by the profession and the
courts. 169 The president's political and personal interests, as well as his
distance from the facts and the traditions of prosecution, are at odds with this
goal. The president retains control over the execution of criminal laws
through the constitutional power to hire and fire the Attorney General. 170
This balance ensures that the president maintains the power to "take Care"
that the laws are faithfully executed without threatening longstanding
prosecutorial norms that help preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
168. Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 3-7.
169. Id. at 74-75 ("While prosecutors sometimes fail to live up to expectations, they are
better situated than the President to make sound, disinterested prosecutorial decisions in
individual cases in light of the evidence and prosecutorial policies and traditions."). Our
argument here is in no way a plea for the status quo. We have, along with others, argued that
prosecutors' offices should be structured so as to maximize the effective exercise of their
discretionary obligations. Green & Roiphe, supra note 36, at 515-35.
170. Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 23-26.
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